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Abstract 
 With the massive infusion of external (foreign) capital into the Chinese economy since the 
1980s, some historical villages in Huangshan city have been largely transformed for heritage 
tourism. Preservation restrictions on altering structures are in place to keep intact the 
architectural and morphological integrity of the sites. Questions arise on the roles played by 
various governments and private sector enterprises, and their influence on local residents 
In the summer of 2013, I conducted field work including interviews, participatory 
observation and archival research on three adjacent villages in Huangshan city: Hongcun, 
Chengkan, and Xucun. They were at three different tourism development levels and in different 
jurisdictions. 
As a World Heritage Site, Hongcun attracts more tourists than the other two historical 
villages. To put Hongcun on display, a private sector enterprise authorized by local county 
government constructed not only infrastructure for tourism but also heritage.  Heritage 
construction for tourism includes selection of historical sites for display and reinventions of 
historical stories for the staging of an ongoing pageant play performance to attract tourists. 
Successful tourism, however, has fostered conflict within the local community and largely 
transformed local villagers’ lives.  
Seeing Hongcun as the benchmark in heritage tourism, Chengkan imitates Hongcun by 
introducing external private sector enterprises and by implementing the strict Cultural Relic 
Preservation Law. The Chengkan Tourism Company has tried many innovative marketing 
strategies to compete with Hongcun, such as place-branding and place construction to 
demonstrate its feng shui authenticity. As such, Chenkan’s residents face strict enforcement of 
the Cultural Relic Preservation Regulation while getting small benefits from tourism 
development. Also, some of them try to make their own heritage, which is different from the 
hegemonic heritage made by the tourism company. 
Xucun serves as yet another story in that it does not take any measures to lure 
tourists. Knowing it is impossible to compete with other villages, Xucun’s local government 
prefers social stability and security to economic growth. Thus, they broke their contract with the 
private sector tourist company and protected local villagers’ property rights. In this way, the three 
cases suggest that the state plays varying roles in encouraging tourism development and local 
autonomy in implementing tourism development. Also, issues of representation by private 
sectors and local community’s identity and property rights vary markedly at the village scale. 
My thesis contributes to the literature of heritage tourism studies undertaken from a political 
economic perspective.  It uses this perspective to understand landscape in the Chinese context.  
My work also illustrates various avenues of future research on Chinese cultural geography.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Problems and Research Questions 
Heritage and tourism are collaborative industries, heritage converting locations into 
destinations and tourism making them economically viable as exhibits of themselves. 
Locations become museums of themselves within a tourism industry (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 
1998: 151). 
Tourism is one of the largest industries in the world today (Britton, 1991), desirable because 
it brings in a great deal of foreign currency and promotes the local economy. In China, the 
government considers tourism as a way to meet national and local economic goals (Zhang, 
Chong, and Ap, 1999). In fact, heritage tourism’s contribution to GDP has become a means to 
determine the effectiveness of local government officials, some of whom have gone as far as to 
lease historical villages to private firms to develop for tourism.  
When I was conducting fieldwork for this thesis during the summer of 2013, I met an older 
woman while she sat in front of her house selling souvenirs. She lives in a historical village 
where local officials had partnered with private firms to establish heritage tourism. She told me 
she had once been a farmer but was forced to sell her agricultural land to the government-
authorized local tourism company. Her compensation was permission from the local government 
to enlarge one of the windows in her house, a designated historic structure. Normally, 
government preservation regulations would have forbidden a change like this, but the company 
and the government needed both her land and her cooperation; thus, they allowed her to alter her 
house. The tourism company then paved over her family’s agricultural land to make a tour-bus 
parking lot, and she went to work for the tourism company. Now retired, she sits in front of her 
house selling souvenirs. Fortunately, her house was not on the designated tour route; had it been, 
she would not been allowed to supplement her income in this way because such activities are 
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considered disorderly and thus impeding tourism.  
In another historical village I chose to study, I encountered a local senior villager in an 
ancestral hall, a traditional architectural structure upon which descendants affix name tablets to 
honor their forebears. He told me that these halls are places that educate successive generations 
to respect the value of family and the values of their specific family. In the past, ancestral halls 
also served as a sort of courthouse, where individuals who disrespected the values of the family 
were brought for punishment. Before 1949, responsibility for this particular ancestral hall  
belonged to a senior villager’s family. However, after 1949, the Communist Party transformed it 
into state-owned building that served as a primary school until 1992. In 1993, the local 
government repaired it and opened it to the public as a historical tourism site. These stories raise 
the following questions regarding the production of heritage sites in China.  
 
Research Question 1. What are the roles of the various levels of government in tourism 
development? How does each level relate to tourism entrepreneurs? 
To pursue economic growth, the central government redistributed some of its power to local 
governments and coupled the public employee promotion system to the growth of the local 
economy. That is to say, in localities with a stronger economy local government employees have 
a greater possibility of being promoted as officials in the state employment system than 
employees and officials in localities with weaker economies. As a result, every village tries its 
best to promote tourism for local economic growth. Some do a good job; others do not. 
Meanwhile, security needs to be considered. While pursuing economic growth, local 
governments need to guarantee local social stability, which is difficult due to structural shifts and 
imbalances. Thus, state-related governmentalities at various scales/levels need to be examined. 
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Research Question 2. Who designates places as historic and why?  
In China, some villages have been designated as United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites while others historical villages have not. 
Although the United Nations seems to play the leading role, there are many government levels 
and sectors involved. Entities that designate places as historic need to be examined. At a broad 
scale, heritage making for World Heritage Site designation is examined; at a smaller scale, 
heritage making by private sector enterprise is explored.  
  
Research Question 3. What is the role of entrepreneurs in heritage preservation and tourism 
development?  
At times, entrepreneurs create the heritage in heritage tourism, at the request of local 
governments. They market each village as unique and authentic, “packaging” historical villages 
to cater to the tourists. 
 
Research Question 4. What does it mean for local residents—who cherish their identity and 
their culture—to watch that identity and culture get re-represented by external agents? What is 
the influence of the government’s Cultural Relics Preservation Law on the local residents? How 
does it play out in different contexts?  
Basically, the government preserves historical villages, and then private companies market 
them as being exactly the same as they were 300 years ago. In some villages, however, 
entrepreneurs have actually changed cultural “relics” to make them seem more unique. What do 
these actions mean to the villagers, who can only maintain, not decorate or improve, their houses 
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because they have to be as they were thought to be 300 years ago? 
 
Justification of the Research Questions and Research Sites 
During the summer of 2013, I conducted fieldwork in Huangshan city, which is located in 
the southern part of Anhui province. (See Map 1.1). 
 
Map 1.1: City of Huangshan. (By author) 
The locator map in the upper right shows the location of Anhui province, while the map in 
the lower left shows the location of Huangshan city within Anhui province. The main map shows 
Huangshan city with highways and the hierarchy of political boundaries. 
In Huangshan, many historical villages have been developed as supplementary tourism sites 
to Mount Huang—which is a famous and frequently visited World Natural Heritage Site. These 
historical villages soon became well-known heritage tourism sites because of the architectural 
and urban morphological forms associated with Hui culture. This culture was influenced by two 
major migrations during the Northern and Southern Dynasty and the Five Dynasties periods. In 
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both migrations, people left the central plains and took to the mountainous region to avoid 
warfare. Immigrants consisted of many influential and privileged families who brought with 
them a strong fidelity to Confucian family culture (Zhu, 2003). The natural environment further 
shaped Hui culture. The mountainous topography meant less arable land, and with population 
growth, there was not enough food produced locally. Thus, after the middle period of the Ming 
Dynasty, men from Huizhou traveled to eastern China to trade lumber from the mountains for 
food. As a consequence, Hui culture developed a dual orientation: toward business and toward 
Confucian-influenced education. Ultimately, this helped the Huizhou people do well in the 
Imperial Examination System, which screened and accredited young men for government 
employment in ancient China. The exam mainly focused on several classic books on 
Confucianism. Successful Huizhou-born officials then favored Huizhou merchants, who quickly 
became rich and reinvested some of their profits in land in their hometowns and villages. They 
rebuilt houses and infrastructure, such as bridges, schools, and ancestral halls. Through these last 
two forms of social infrastructure, the younger generations became better educated and more 
qualified to take the Imperial Examination and to become government officials. Statistics 
indicate that more than 260 schools were built in Huizhou region from the Song Dynasty to the 
Qing Dynasty. During the eighth year of Emperor Hongwu in the Ming Dynasty (AD 1357), 
Huizhou had 462 schools. During the reign of Emperor Kangxi, the number increased to 562, 
resulting in even more scholars and officials. In the Song Dynasty, 624 people got through the 
final examination in the Imperial Examination System. In the Ming Dynasty, this number was 
392, and in the Qing dynasty, 226 (Liu, 2002) (See Table 1.1.) Thus, the Huizhou culture 
gradually took on its own peculiar regional characteristics that stressed family values, trade, and 
state service (Zhu, 2003). Today, the landscape that this culture produces—the schools, ancestral 
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halls, bridges, and houses—has been transformed into the heritage landscape targeted toward 
tourists.  
Table 1.1: Huizhou Education Situation 
Time Period  Number of Successful Candidates in the 
Highest Imperial Examinations System 
Song Dynasty 624 
Ming Dynasty 329 
Qing Dynasty 226 
 By author, based on Liu, 2002. 
I chose Huangshan city as the research site not only because of its long history but also 
because of two internationally famous historical villages located in this city—Xidi and Hongcun. 
Once I began my fieldwork, however, I amended my site selection because of a conversation 
with an “insider”—a geography professor in China who is familiar with the region. He told me if 
I was interested in tourism development, I should look at three villages—Hongcun, Chengkan, 
and Xucun—because they represent different development levels. Hongcun is most developed, 
as evidenced by its World Heritage title. It is classified as a 5A Tourism Area by the China 
National Tourism Administration (CNTA). Chengkan occupies a middle development level and 
is significant given tensions within the village caused by tourism development. The CNTA 
classifies it as a 4A Tourism Area. Xucun is notable given the richness of its history and 
architecture, which in the view of many Chinese is more worthy of a heritage designation than 
Hongcun and Chengkan. However, tourism development there is very weak—almost 
nonexistent—in part because of its 3A Tourism Area designation.  
Once in the field, I discovered that the three villages did indeed display differences in 
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incomes, lifestyles, and place-branding strategies of tourism companies. Additionally, the role of 
government in tourism development differs among the three villages. To be exact, government 
agencies get involved in tourism to varying degrees, depending on the county and village 
officials, jurisdiction, and intergovernmental relations. 
 
Methodology 
My methodology consisted of ethnographic participant observation and interviews in the 
field, and archival research at East China Normal University. I conducted interviews with 
representatives of three different sectors within heritage tourism: government officials, tourism 
company employees, and local residents. I chose local residents in public spaces or at their 
places of business who appeared to be available and not busy doing other things. They were 
either senior villagers (60 years old and older) or the owners of different souvenir shops. 
This strategy worked well in Chengkan and Hongcun but not as well in Xucun, a typical 
rural village in China. Young laborers migrate to big cities for jobs, leaving the elders, women, 
and children at home. Hence, most potential interviewees were senior villagers who spoke local 
dialects I had difficulty understanding. Also, there were no souvenir stores in Xucun. Therefore, I 
talked to two middle-aged villagers who operated a grocery store. I believe the difficulties I 
encountered in this village in relation to selecting interviewees were related to its low level of 
tourism development. 
To select officials from various levels of government to interview, I began by speaking to 
receptionists at local government offices and asking who I should interview for my project. They 
usually forwarded me to people either in charge of cultural relics preservation or knowledgeable 
about tourism development. This strategy was effective for the village and town levels but less so 
 
8 
 
for city-level officials. When I went to Huangshan city’s propaganda department to ask about its 
work in advertising these three villages, they checked my national identity card (身份证), my 
current graduate student ID card, and my undergraduate student ID card. The interview did not 
go well because the officer did not seem to take my inquiry seriously. The meeting abruptly 
ended when another person entered the office holding an introductory letter that had been issued 
by someone in an upper-government position. I learned that I would need to have this type of 
letter in the future if I was to have a meaningful interview with a city-level official.  
I gained access to the tourism company in Hongcun (Jingyi Company) with the help of a 
local official in the city-level tourism administration. I was concerned the tourism company 
would not grant an interview because it was a famous and economically successful venture. The 
government official gave me the manager’s contact information, and I called him to make an 
appointment. Knowing that I was referred by a government official, he quickly accepted my 
request. When I arrived, he referred me to an employee responsible for public relations who 
could best answer my questions.  
The tourism company in Chengkan (Chengkan Eight Diagram Tourism Company) was 
much easier to access. I learned about this small firm from the owner of the inn where I stayed. 
The supervisor of the company had operated a restaurant and then moved to Chengkan to begin a 
tourism company due to the good relationship he had with the local government. When I first 
visited the company’s office building and introduced myself, I talked to a lower-level employee 
who told me to come back later to interview the supervisor. When I returned, the supervisor was 
again not available, but I interviewed the person I had met previously; it turned out he was also 
responsible for the company’s public relations. For my research in Xucun, I interviewed the 
supervisor of the tourism company using my undergraduate professor’s recommendation to gain 
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access. 
In summary, I interviewed 42 people, including local residents, officials from tourism 
companies, and village- and city-level government officials (Table 1.2). The interviews were 
semistructured; I had some questions outlined for the interview, but the conversation varied from 
individual to individual. Some interviewees were not very forthcoming during the interview, 
making these encounters briefer than others. For those who were very talkative, the conversation 
continued until its natural ending. Table 1.2 shows the number of people I interviewed in each of 
the different sectors in the three villages. 
Table 1.2: People Interviewed during Fieldwork 
 Hongcun Chengkan Xucun 
Residents 11 11 7 
Tourist guides 1 1 1 
Government officials  1 2 1 
Other tourist company 
employees 
1 1 1 
 By author. 
In addition, I interviewed several government officials in Huangshan city about tourism 
development and heritage preservation. They represented the Municipal Propaganda Department, 
Huangshan Tourism Administration, Cultural Relics Bureau, and Heritage Office in the Planning 
Bureau. 
Many scholars have discussed the insider/outsider role in fieldwork. Yang Yang (2014) 
recognized her “stranger-familiar” role (Lipman 1998) because she applied a Euro-Anglo 
framework to explore Chinese issues as a Chinese researcher. I found it difficult to define my 
positionality during this research. It is very complex to define what an insider or outsider is. 
Although I felt my standing with the locals was similar to Yang’s stranger-familiar role, it did not 
go as Yang argued. She focused on the fact that she could understand the local language, which 
she believed made the locals cooperative as participants during her research. I did not categorize 
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myself as an insider because I did not grow up in Hui culture; however, I am Chinese and speak 
the same language and share many sociocultural habits. As such, I perceived myself as being in a 
liminal role that did not fit into any specific category and that varied depending on the village 
and the sector being investigated. 
In Hongcun and Chengkan, although I was an outsider, residents and officials perceived me 
as “normal” because they were used to outsiders—such as tourists. In Hongcun, I stayed at a 
family inn inside the historical village and could speak with residents naturally in front of their 
houses. In Chengkan, some villagers invited me into their homes for a tour as if they were 
hosting a guest. The situation was quite different in Xucun, however. Because there are not many 
tourists visiting the village, I was considered an outsider, especially when I returned to do 
fieldwork on my own.  Everyone stared at me wherever I went! 
 
Structure 
This thesis is structured into six chapters; they involve this introduction, the theoretical 
approach, three case studies, and the conclusion. 
In the theoretical approach chapter (Chapter 2), I examine the literature in tourism studies in 
three sections: scientific, post-structuralism, and “beyond post-structuralism.” I argue that 
business-led tourism research tends to apply a scientific approach. The post-structural literature 
was shaped by the cultural turn in social science epistemology and transformed the field of 
tourism studies so that it focus more on representation, discourse, and identity than the ideology 
behind them. I argue that my research blends the two aforementioned approaches into a political 
economy approach. Thus, I characterize this thesis as an example of “critical tourism studies” 
with “new” cultural geography sensibilities in the Chinese context.  
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Background information is also provided in Chapter 2 to provide a foundation for the 
discussions in subsequent chapters. Since 1978, Chinese scholars have viewed tourism as an 
economic activity and as a signifier of Open and Reform policies (Zhang, Chong, and Ap, 1999). 
They have noted the increasing importance of external capital investments in local tourism 
industries. Understanding policies and the Chinese legal system is critical because overlaps in the 
latter lead to tensions in communities in relation to tourism development (Liu, 2008). 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain case studies of Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun, respectively, in 
terms of the politics of historical villages’ representation in heritage tourism, the roles that 
various governments play, and local communities’ reaction to tourism and preservation. 
The politics of historical villages’ representation are analyzed using the tourism routes and 
attraction sites that the private sector (tourism companies) has designed. The tourism companies 
do not put whole villages on display, and they do not select tourism sites randomly or even 
according to their historical value, but instead choose them based on cost. Furthermore, because 
of competition, some companies physically alter the village or construct village imaginaries to 
make the setting more alluring to tourists.  
The role of government and governmental cooperation with tourism companies are 
examined. The public-private relationship varies depending on the village, raising the question of 
who has the right to designate heritage. This topic is particularly important for World Heritage 
Sites, which are created via a government-led process. The Chinese central government assigned 
the project of developing World Heritage Sites to the Anhui provincial government, which in turn 
solicited input from academic scholars before assigning this project to a specific city, 
Huangshan. However, the county-level governments within Huangshan were, in the end, actually 
responsible for selecting candidate villages and for preparing them for examination by 
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UNESCO. 
There are differences from village to village as to (a) what these developments meant for 
local residents, (b) whose dwelling places were put on display, and (c) which villages were 
redefined by others. I discuss tourism development’s effects on host communities by examining 
some individuals’ lives in each village. Villagers’ personal lives and their ability (or inability) to 
enter into negotiation with tourism companies have been influenced by heritage preservation. At 
stake is self-autonomy over identity.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with summaries and future research plans. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
Introduction 
Heritage tourism is “centered on what we have inherited, which can mean anything from 
historic buildings, to art works, to beautiful scenery” (Yale, 1991: 21, cited in Garrod and Fyall, 
2001). Heritage tourism includes all the issues that tourism geography focuses on, such as 
development models, spatial laws, representation, identity, community planning, etc. However, it 
has its own unique characteristics: the consumption object is heritage, the local community’s 
ancestors’ labor is put on display, and it is closely related to history, which is closely connected 
to identity. In addition, discourse, representation, property rights, heritage preservation, and 
heritage tourism as a way for development are all important issues. 
Historically, business-oriented research dominated tourism studies. It used economic 
modeling to predict profitability, which linked it to aspects of economic geography and regional 
science.  Later, the cultural turn in the social sciences (including geography, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, psychology, (small segments of) economics, and therefore 
tourism studies) fostered the emergence of something that might be “loosely termed post-
structuralism” (Barnett, 1998; Valentine, 2001). This influenced tourism research agendas by 
encouraging critical (as opposed to business-oriented) tourism studies. However, Raoul Bianchi 
has criticized critical tourism studies that focus solely on discourse, representation, and identity;  
instead, he  promotes research that adds political economy (Bianchi, 2012).  This research moves 
‘beyond the post-structuralist.’ 
In this chapter, I examine the scientific, post-structuralist, and beyond post-structuralist 
approaches.  I contextualize my research subject—heritage tourism—and examine some of the 
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major stakeholders’ roles in its production, focusing on various levels of government and their 
partnership with private sector enterprises, property rights and heritage preservation.  I also 
address the representation of and resistance to tourism development by local community 
members. I explore government-private relationships and the debate regarding whether the 
Chinese state is now neoliberal. I also examine research about local community perceptions 
about tourism development. These frameworks help answer the research questions raised in 
Chapter 1 regarding the roles played by various levels of government the private sector, the local 
residents’ perceptions of tourism, identity issues in heritage making, and difficulties surrounding 
the Cultural Relics Preservation Law. 
 
Tourism Research 
Business-led Tourism Research 
According to Robinson (1976), the rise of mass tourism is a postwar phenomenon that 
resulted from improvements in transportation and communication technology. In his book A 
Geography of Tourism, he categorized research themes and analyzed tourism from a scientific 
economic perspective by discussing supply and demand and management, among other issues. 
He identified two reasons why the tourism industry is important to Western countries:  
1. In many countries, especially Western European countries and those of North 
America, the tourist trade is now a major activity employing large numbers of 
people;  
2. The receipts from tourism form a very valuable invisible export, are especially 
important as a dollar earner, and frequently contribute substantially to the balance of 
payments. (Robinson, 1976: xxii)  
Today, travel and tourism are one of the largest industries in the Western world (Britton, 
1991). For local communities, it is a means toward capital accumulation and place development. 
Therefore, it is necessary to describe, explain, and forecast tourist behavior, spending, and 
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associated externality effects. Butler’s (1980) Tourist Area Life Cycle (TALC) model, for 
example, explains the different stages that tourism sites go through in terms of visitation and 
profitability. Tim Gale (2012) considers this model as representative of the structuralist thinking 
in tourism studies in the early 1980s.  
The TALC model divides the development of tourism sites into six stages: (1) exploration, 
(2) involvement, (3) development, (4) consolidation, (5) stagnation, and (6) decline or 
rejuvenation (see Fig. 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Tourist area life cycle. (From Butler, 1980.) 
The exploration stage is “characterized by small numbers of tourists,” where the local 
community is “unchanged” by tourism (Butler, 1980: 6). Local residents move into the 
involvement stage when the number of tourists increases, some tourism facilities are constructed, 
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and the locals begin catering to the tourists.  
The development begins when an area’s tourism increases enough to warrant an externally 
based operator to oversee the trade, thereby reducing the community’s dominant involvement, 
although much of the local infrastructure and facilities exist in support of the tourism trade. 
Eventually, the rate of tourism development declines, but the total number of tourists continues 
to grow. Butler claims that some tension from permanent residents would emerge at this point, 
the consolidation stage, because of some “deprivation and restrictions upon their activities” 
(Butler, 1980: 8). The stagnation stage follows: the number of tourists peaks and local carrying 
capacity is reached or exceeded, thereby creating environmental issues that degrade tourist 
attractions and make the site “unfashionable and uncompetitive” (Butler, 1980: 8). Meanwhile, 
some surrounding development emerges to try to prolong profitability. After this, there are two 
possible outcomes: the decline stage (when the tourism trade comes to an end) or the 
rejuvenation stage (when new, unique attractions become the focus). 
According to Gale, the TALC model is “a brilliant example of how scientific progress could 
and should work…as probably the only model in tourism that has been scrutinized in many 
different contexts with modifications suggested to fit specific situations and circumstances” 
(Oppermann, 1998: 180, quoted in Gale, 2012: 41). Some scholars applied this model to examine 
tourism in Zhang Jiajie National Forest Park in China. They concluded that the tourist industry 
has passed through the first four stages and is now in the consolidation stage; the industry has 
become important to the local economy and the government and private sectors will play 
important roles in further development (Zhong, Deng, and Xiang, 2008).  
Heritage tourism, specifically, has been studied using the TALC model. According to Logan 
(2001), heritage tourism offers the possibility for economic growth by showcasing distinctive 
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local cultures, the key component within the “heritage industry” (Edson 2004: 343). Graham, 
Ashworth, and Tunbridge (2000) also argue that the conservation of heritage resources leads to 
their economic use; this has inspired research exploring heritage tourism in terms of supply and 
demand (Apostolakis, 2003). However, there are some concerns about the applicability of the 
economic model in different contexts, such as China. Li and Lo (2004) address this issue in their 
examination of the market appeal model in China. 
 
Critical Tourism Studies 
Critical tourism studies focus on discourse, representation, and identity, particularly as they 
combine around the concept of authenticity. According to Fine and Speer (1997, quoted in 
Chhabra, Healyb, and Sillsc, 2003: 705), “an authentic experience involves participation in a 
collective ritual, where strangers get together in a cultural production to share a feeling of 
closeness or solidarity. This cultural production is not a total re-creation of the past. In fact, 
nostalgic collective memory selectively reconstructs the past to serve the needs of the present.” 
Researchers have shown that tourists who have a more personal attachment to a tourist site 
through shared heritage will change their behavior in the site more than those who lack personal 
heritage attachments (Poria, Butler, and Airey, 2003). Peggy Teo and Brenda Yeoh (1997), for 
example, incorporated this logic when they explored local residents’ and tourists’ perceptions of 
a heritage site that had been re-created for tourism. They showed that local residents attached 
memories to the old landscape, while tourists with no prior direct experience of the place 
considered it more as a commodity. These findings inform my research in terms of the local 
communities’ perceptions of tourism development, especially in relation to tension among 
residents and their identity.  
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These scholars’ research on authenticity and identity are examples of critical tourism studies. 
Although I later examine them critically for their neglect of political economy, they have 
informed how I frame authenticity and identity in my research. They take authenticity to be an 
aspect of the subjective feelings of tourists. I did not interview tourists, but I apply authenticity 
as a concept in my consideration of how the government and private sector market historical 
villages as authentic (unique) to compete with similar historical villages. Underlying this is the 
assumption that authentic (unique) villages will be recognized and visited by tourists and, 
therefore, bring in profits. 
In the context of heritage tourism literature, there is a broad discussion around the concept of 
heritage. The most frequently asked questions are who designates specific places as heritage sites 
(Adams, 2003) and who determines that they should be put on display. Graham, Ashworth, and 
Tunbridge (2000) argue that the definition of heritage should be clarified, especially in an era 
when the use of heritage is so abused. “Heritage is selective” (Timothy and Boyd, 2002: 2) and 
historically and socially constructed (Harvey, 2001). It is usually a selection by private or public 
sectors for a certain reason (either collective identity or profit) (Lowenthal, 1985).  However, 
other scholars argue that the purpose of selection and construction is tourist consumption of an 
experiential or emotional product. Cassia (1999) argues that heritage is a way to consume the 
academic knowledge produced by history, and sometimes it is a selective consumption of 
elements in the past (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 2000), which mostly results in an inauthentic 
experience for tourists (MacCannell, 1979). Heritage can be seen from a symbolic and social 
construction perspective in addition to its materialistic nature and “the significance of 
constructing ‘the gaze’ and ‘the other’ in engendered heritage representation and consumption” 
(Aitchison, 1999: 59). Therefore, a more centered question around heritage would be who 
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designates places as heritage for consumption. “Frequently, [political or social] power was 
conceptualized as existing on its own as practically a commodity or a capacity or a currency 
which could be traded or fought over” (Church and Coles, 2007: preface). Thus, it is important to 
incorporate political economy into critical tourism studies.  
 
Combined Political Economy and Critical Tourism Studies 
Some scholars maintain that business-oriented tourism research neglects issues of power, 
discourse, and representation (Ateljevic and others, 2007, quoted in Gale, 2012: 45). 
Nevertheless, critical tourism studies are gradually being mainstreamed into the business-
oriented approach through publications that seek to meld the two literatures; examples of this 
provided by Gale (2012: 45) include: 
Embodying Tourism Research: Advancing Critical Approaches (Dubrovnik, 2005), The 
Critical Turn in Tourism Studies: Promoting an Academy of Hope (Split, 2007), Connecting 
Academies of Hope: Creative Vistas and Critical Visions (Zadar, 2009), and Tourism Futures: 
Creative and Critical Action (Cardiff, 2011). 
However, critical tourism studies still privilege the cultural, which means “the discursive, 
symbolic and performativity realm of tourism and tourists’ experiences” over political and 
economic issues (Bianchi, 2012). Bianchi argues that “despite their［critical tourism studies］ 
avowed political orientation, advocates of the ‘critical turn’ appear largely concerned with the 
analysis of culture, discourse and representation within the confines of a globalizing free market 
system, which remains largely external to critical scrutiny” (Bianchi, 2012: 47). 
I concur with Bianchi’s argument. Critical tourism studies emphasize representation, 
discourse, and cultural power, but largely ignore political economy. Bianchi, however, almost 
presents this as post-structural/structural dualism. To counter this, Gale argues that in post-
structuralism “social structures may constrain human action, yet these are not strictly 
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economic—culture and politics (power) play their part, too” (Gale, 2012: 39).  
To begin incorporating political economy into critical tourism studies, Valentine (2001) 
claims it is important to analyze the structures that cause social injustice while acknowledging 
the importance of cultural difference and form of representation. She concludes that at a macro 
scale we must recognize the collectiveness of a community and the existence of a structure 
system that influences people. However, on a small scale, it is reasonable to discuss difference 
and representation, which could also reflect social injustice. As such, a hybridized research 
agenda emerges from combining these discussions and then having new ones at different scales. 
One possible way forward is offered by Anne Snitow (1990). She argues that academics need 
to retain a constantly shifting scale of focus, in which sometimes it is appropriate to focus on 
difference and minimize claims to a shared identity or goal, whereas at other times it is 
politically expedient to “maximize” a shared identity or position to proclaim common needs 
and political aims. To think in terms of shifting scales seems a particularly appropriate 
direction for social geographers to begin to map a new agenda for the sub-discipline. 
(Valentine, 2001: 171). 
Answering this call (to combine political economy with critical tourism studies to 
understand more fully the tourism process), I focus on some China tourism researchers who have 
already done relevant research on the issue of commodification, specifically as related to the 
government’s role and tourism and cultural relic preservation policies. Xu, Yan, and Zhu (2013), 
for example, examine commodification in a Chinese heritage village; however, they indicate, 
“this is just a preliminary study on the commodification of Chinese heritage villages; it lacks the 
comparison of the level of commodification” (page: 415). 
Some scholars are exploring heritage tourism policy and implementation because the state 
considers heritage tourism as a tool to promote local economy. Hongliang Yan and Bill Bramwell 
(2008) explore the relationship between heritage tourism related to Confucianism and the 
government’s policy-making system and attitude toward tradition. In addition, Yi Wang and Bill 
Bramwell (2012) examine the role played by government in determining the priority of heritage 
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protection and tourism development with a political economy approach. Timothy Oakes (2013) 
examines heritage tourism in the Chinese context using the theoretical framework of 
modernization, which is considered one approach to development and includes modernization, 
dependency, and neoliberalism theories. Jason Beery (2012) analyzes the private sector in 
managing tourism and competition, further demonstrating the tourism industry as a capital 
accumulation process in a neoliberalism trend.  
My heritage tourism research considers political economy through the lens of 
governmentality.  I also explore the agenda embedded within neoliberalism that posits that 
heritage is a controllable instrument that will improve economic and social development. Thus 
my study considers neoliberalism, the role played by governments and the private sector in 
tourism development, and the manipulation of heritage representation for place promotion in a 
competitive tourism market. Representations of historical villages vary with different sectors.  
As such, I developed a research agenda to combine political economy and critical tourism 
studies and to examine different cases at various scales. Within this framework, it is possible to 
analyze the roles of the main stakeholders—the state (government at multiple levels/spatial 
scales), the private sector, and the local community—in heritage tourism’s production.  
 
Main Stakeholders in Heritage Tourism’s Production 
State and Private Sector 
There are heated discussions about whether China is a neoliberal state. Several scholars 
conclude that it has many neoliberal characteristics, but that the state still plays a strong role 
(Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011; Harvey, 2005; So, 2007). Some scholars claim that this is 
neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005), while other scholars claim the 
 
22 
 
situation follows a more general East Asia development model (So, 2007). In this context, I agree 
with Emily Yeh’s statement, “We find ‘neoliberalization’ useful to mark the deepening of market 
reforms since Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 ‘southern tour,’ including an emphasis on commodification, 
the withdrawal of state welfare provisions, privatization of formerly commonly owned assets and 
increasing disparities between rich and poor” (Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011: 165).  
As Yeh and Gaerrang mentioned, these so-called neoliberal characteristics were initiated by 
Open and Reform policies.  Now add to this the idea that tourism has become a signifier of Open 
and Reform in China (Xiao, 2006). According to Zhang, Chong, and Ap (1999), prior to 1978, 
government officials viewed tourism as a political activity. With the implementation of the Open 
and Reform policies in 1978, they began considering tourism as both a political instrument and 
an economic activity. Hongge Xiao (2006) specifically points out that tourism should be seen as 
a signifier of Open and Reform policies in terms of economic development; this conclusion is 
based on his analysis of five talks given in 1979 by then Vice Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping 
(Xiao, 2006). One of these talks was given in Huangshan city. 
Qihong
1
 is famous all over the world. Huangshan has the resources to generate wealth. This is 
a good place for tourism development. There should be planning for it in the provincial 
government….We need to be ambitious and to establish and broadcast the brand of 
Huangshan….Employees need to be paid according to their labor quality and labor time. Nine 
hundred million people cannot get rich at the same time. It has to be some region that gets 
rich first. Within a region, only some people get rich first. The income from tourism needs to 
be shared with local government. To initiate tourism, the central government also needs to 
invest. (Local chronicles of Huangsan city, 2010) 
By Deng targeting “entrepreneurship, foreign investment in tourist facilities, salary/wage 
(re)distributions, marketing and promotion, and customer orientation” in one of his talks, Xiao 
(2006) suggests that this may indicate an ideological transformation of the Chinese government 
to “capitalist business operations.” These transformations, in turn, led to policy changes that 
showed a struggle to balance between a government-led versus market-driven orientation. 
                                                             
1 Qihong is a kind of red tea in Huangshan city. 
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Meanwhile, instead of becoming a political instrument for diplomacy, tourism has become an 
economic activity for development that boomed with the Open and Reform policies (Xiao, 
2006).  
The first period of transformation was from 1978 to 1984. In 1978, the Bureaus of Travel 
and Tourism under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reorganized as the State General 
Administration of Travel and Tourism; it was directly regulated by the State Council and became 
responsible for tourism administration. Meanwhile, Anhui province’s Travel Tour Business 
Administration was established to manage the tourism industry in Anhui province (local 
chronicles of Huangshan city, 2010). In 1982, the functions of China International Travel 
Services were separated from the State General Administration of Travel and Tourism, and it was 
later renamed the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA). From 1982 on, tourism 
enterprise activities were no longer government functions (Sofield and Li, 2011). In 1984, the 
State Council allowed “central government, localities, individual government departments, 
collectives and even individuals to invest in and operate tourism development projects” (Zhang, 
Chong, and Ap, 1999: 476). This encouraged the development of town and village enterprises 
(TVEs
2
) and the private sector in tourism (Sofield and Li, 2011). 
The next transformation period occurred from 1985 to 1991. In 1985, tourism was 
incorporated into the Seventh Five-Year National Plan (1986–90) (Zhang, Chong, and Ap, 1999; 
Shepherd, 2006), signaling the point in time when the central government began viewing tourism 
as an economic development activity. In 1986, Anhui province incorporated the tourism industry 
into its National Economic and Social Development Plan; the Travel Tour Business 
Administration became an independent institution and part of the Anhui province government 
                                                             
2 TVEs are market-oriented enterprises owned by town or village governments. 
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structure. By 1991, tourism was seen as a chief service sector in the Eighth Five-Year National 
Plan (1991–95) (Shepherd, 2006).  
The final period of transformation was from 1992 to 2002. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping gave a 
talk in Guangdong, further confirming the opening up of hinterland China. 
As the government gradually decreased restrictions and controls at the macro-policy level, a 
more truly private sector began to expand and by 1995 it outrivaled TVEs. With increased 
market integration and competition, TVEs lost their protected position; the changes in the 
economic environment gradually reduced the benefits of public ownership and increased their 
costs. They experienced a dramatic decline in the face of increased competition and rewards 
accruing to the more efficient, better managed private operations and those that survived were 
forced to restructure substantially. By 1996, TVEs accounted for approximately 7% of GDP, 
down from about 30% at their peak (Sofield and Li, 2011: 509). 
During this time, a wave of investment occurred in China. After 10 years of economic 
development, China’s eastern coastal area established a sound export-oriented industrial system. 
The region’s labor-intensive industries needed to be upgraded and transformed into technology- 
and capital-intensive enterprises. Because of globalization and China’s participation in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the state adopted many flexible strategies to attract more of these 
types of industries. At the same time, mid-western and western China developed at a much 
slower rate. As such, the central government issued a set of policies to induce economic growth 
in the mid-western region. One approach was to apply investment promotion strategies 
intensively and to accept the industries removed in the eastern region because of industrial 
upgrades (Zhong, 2006).  
According to Zhong (2006) and Harvey (2005), financial resources were more flexible in 
the 1990s than they were 10 years earlier. According to these researchers, at the beginning of the 
Open and Reform policies, investment promotion targeted foreign capital and companies. 
However, with the development of Chinese private enterprises, local governments promoted 
investment through those private companies and capital, which became important investment 
resources in the mid-western region. With the development of the market economy, local 
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governments were more able to allocate resources at micro scales and to become relatively 
independent active agents earning most of the profits from development. To control local 
governments, the central government took over the local governments’ financial rights, forcing 
them to compete for those budgets. The quality, amount, and speed of local economic growth 
became the main criteria for the central government in its evaluation of local government 
officials, thereby determining whether they would be promoted. This formed the basis of the 
personnel promotion system for Chinese government officials. Therefore, it has come to be very 
much in the interest of local government officials to support efforts to boost the local economy. 
Given this situation at the macro level, Anhui province, located in the middle of China (see 
Map 2.1), adopted a set of policies to improve its economic growth.  
 
Map 2.1: China’s regional divisions. (By author.) 
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Anhui provincial and Huangshan municipal governments stressed the importance of tourism 
development. In 1992, Anhui province’s government held a symposium on tourism and the 
economy and pointed out that the tourism industry should be the pillar industry in Anhui’s 
economy. In 1994, local governments promoted external capital for tourism development in 
Hongcun (Yi County), Chengkan (Huizhou County), and Xucun (She County) after Vice Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji gave explicit instructions regarding tourism development in Yi County 
(local chronicles of Huangshan city, 2010).  
As suggested, tourism development in Anhui province, or broadly speaking, in China, is a 
government-led process. This process has many neoliberal characteristics, such as the 
distribution of power to local governments and the involvement of the private sector, but the 
state still plays a strong hand, such as its control over tax, budgetary, and personnel promotion 
concerns. In this environment, tourism in Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun boomed. Booming 
tourism, however, has caused many changes and raised several issues for the local communities. 
 
Local Community 
Tourism development has raised many issues among local residents, especially those whose 
dwelling places are selected to be displayed on the heritage tour. A review of these issues reveals 
that resistance to tourism development and heritage preservation, and the effects of these on 
identity deserve attention.  
Resistance to tourism development within the host community mainly focuses on the host 
community’s participation and whether or not it decides to cooperate with the plans of the state 
and private sector.  Ying and Zhou (2007) compare two cases, Hongcun and Xidi, the two World 
Heritage Sites in Huangshan city. Lack of consideration for the concerns of the host community 
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in tourism development has caused tensions in Hongcun; more inclusion and participation of the 
host community in Xidi has resulted in more benefits to residents and less tension and resistance 
to tourism development. The main reason for the resistance to tourism development among local 
community in this case is the level of interest from tourism. Other researchers suggest that local 
communities’ reaction to tourism development is influenced not only by benefits but also by 
heritage preservation issues. 
In heritage tourism, one main resistance or tension among the host community is the issue of 
preservation. Historical sites are regulated under the Cultural Relics Preservation Law but private 
property is protected under the newly formed Real Right Law. In this case, the two laws 
contradict with each other and no specific regulations exist regarding which law should be 
implemented in any given situation. As such, government officials have much more latitude in 
determining which law to implement. This legal overlap is formed by the structure of Chinese 
legal system (see Fig. 2.2).  
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China’s legal system is unified and multileveled. Unified means that no law or 
administrative regulation can contradict the Constitution of the P.R.C., which is the fundamental 
law. Laws created at lower levels of government administration cannot contradict those created 
in upper levels. This hierarchy is outlined in Fig. 2.3. Legislative authority belongs to the 
People’s Congress and its standing committee.  
In the hierarchy, after the Constitution, there are seven basic categories of laws: constitution-
related, civil and commercial, economic, administrative, social, criminal, and litigation and non-
litigation procedural laws. These are all issued by the People’s Congress of the P.R.C., but some 
laws can be modified by the standing committee of the People’s Congress when it is not in 
session (Zhang, 2009; Huang, 1996; Fu, 2012).  
Article 22 of the Constitution puts forth, “the state protects historical interests, precious 
cultural relics and other important historic and cultural properties.” Three laws are particularly 
relevant to cultural relic preservation: City Planning Act of the P.R.C., Cultural Relics 
Preservation Law of the P.R.C., and Administrative Law of the P.R.C.  
City Planning Act (April 1, 1990), Article 14: In city planning, attention should be paid to 
protection and improvement of urban ecological environment, prevention of pollution and its 
harmful effects, enhancement of tree planting. Efforts should be made to achieve a clean and 
healthy city environment, to preserve historical and cultural relics, traditional customs, local 
specialties and natural scenery. 
Rules for the Implementation of the City Planning Act of the People’s Republic of China in 
Anhui Province (August 30, 1991), Article 15: When constructing new city areas and 
renovating old areas, practical measures should be taken according to related laws and 
regulations, to protect architectures, buildings, antiques, structures and ancient and famous 
trees that have important historical and cultural values.  
 
Law of Cultural Relics Protection (November 19, 1982), Article 2: Within the boundaries of 
the People’s Republic of China, the following cultural relics with historic, artistic and 
scientific values are under state protection. 1. Ancient cultural relics, ancient tombs and 
funerary objects, ancient architectures, rock grottoes and stone inscriptions with historic, 
artistic and scientific values. 2. Architectures and relics which are related to important historic 
events, revolutionary movements and historic figures, and thus having important memorial 
and educational significance and values as historical data. . . . Article 5: The ownership of 
memorial relics, ancient architectures and traditional cultural relics belonging to collective 
groups and individuals is protected by state laws, and owners must abide by relevant laws of 
preservation. (quote from Ministry of Construction; the Administration of Cultural Relics)   
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In my research, the multileveled nature of the legal system refers to the situation in 
which the People’s Congress and its standing committee in different levels have the 
supreme authority to enact laws. Meanwhile, the Administrative agencies such as the State 
Council, the one in the national level, also hold certain legislative power. In essence, both 
the State Council and the provincial People’s Congress and its standing committee can 
issue local administrative regulations. Also, a large municipality’s People’s Congress and 
its standing committee can issue its own local administrative regulations with the approval 
of its higher-level provincial People’s Congress; those local administrative regulations 
have to be put on record with the national People’s Congress.  
Furthermore, the provincial People’s Congress in minority autonomous areas can 
issue its own administrative regulations according to its minority politics, economic 
situation, and cultural characteristics, with the approval from the upper-level People’s 
Congress. Ministries and commissions under the State Council and provincial and major 
municipal government can issue regulations according to laws and administrative 
regulations. For example, different government levels of tourism administrative can issue 
regulations for tourism activity, which need to be put on record with the State Council, 
while regulations issued by local tourism administrations need to be put on record with the 
State Council and the local People’s Congress (Zhang, 2009; Fu, 2012). All regulations 
must be put on record with the national People’s Congress’s standing committee, and they 
must not contradict any laws in the nation’s Constitution.  
Higher and local administrative regulations relevant to cultural relics preservation in 
Huangshan include Specifications for the Implementation of the Cultural Relics Protection 
Act of the P.R.C., Provisional Regulations on Management of Scenery Spots and Cultural 
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Interests, Rules of the Implementation of the City Planning Act of the People’s Republic of 
China in Anhui Province, Rules for the Implementation of the Cultural Relics Protection 
Act of the P.R.C., and Regulations for the Preservation of Ancient Residential Buildings in 
Southern Anhui Province. The last listed serves as the most detailed set of cultural relics 
preservation regulation relevant to the case studies in my research. Several articles in this 
regulation stand out regarding how it affects local residents.  
Article 2: All historical dwellings in this regulation refer to architectures built before AD 
1911 with historic, artistic, and scientific value, which include individual houses, ancestral 
halls, temples, academic colleges, etc. from ancient times.  
Article 16: Different government levels hold responsibility for the historical buildings in their 
district.  
Article 17: The repair and preservation of historical buildings cannot violate the principle of 
“no change on its original formation.” The agency hired to preserve historical houses should 
be approved by the administrative departments. The preservation plan should also be 
approved by the administrative departments for cultural relics. 
Article 18: The owner or user of a historical building should be responsible for its 
preservation. If there is financial difficulty in doing so, the local government can offer some 
help.   
Article 21: All behaviors that destroy historical buildings are forbidden. 3 
The alteration and repair of historical buildings built before AD 1911 is strictly controlled. 
Local governments supervise the implementation of the regulation, and the local villagers who 
own the historical buildings are responsible for their preservation; that preservation work and 
restoration should be done by a professional team recognized by local governments. According 
to the regulations, when the owner cannot afford to pay for a professional team to repair a 
building, the local government may pay for it. This is where tension arises for villagers; the 
articles contradict the newly issued Real Right Law. See Fig. 2.3.  
                                                             
3 From http://www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/1997/30347.htm 
From The Protection Regulation of Historical Villages in Southern Anhui Province, translated by the author 
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between Real Right Law and Cultural Relics Preservation Law. (By author.) 
Various scholars have discussed the contradiction between the Real Right Law and the 
Cultural Relics Preservation Law. According to Hongbing Liu (2008), the Real Right Law falls 
in the private law category, which is aimed at manipulating relationships arising from the 
ownership and circulation of goods or capital among equal subjects. The Cultural Relics 
Preservation Law is in the public law category, which intends to balance the social relationships 
created by the state’s management of national cultural relics (Liu 2008). Additionally, the Real 
Right Law is a general law while the Cultural Relics Preservation Law is a special law, which 
follows the principle that special laws supersede general laws. Liu argues that the Cultural Relics 
Preservation Law does not function well and that it violates citizens’ legal rights in relation to 
cultural relic ownership.  
This is a problematic and complicated issue. Influenced by the then-Soviet Union, Chinese 
law maintains that land and cultural relics are state owned. Normally, it is the central government 
that controls property rights, but it is impossible for it to control cultural relics in individual 
communities. As such, local governments become the entities that actually own the cultural 
relics. It is at this juncture where the issue of sharing and cooperation among various 
governments emerges.  
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The case in Anhui involves land and cultural relic property rights. Property rights refer to 
both ownership and right to use. In Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun, the lands belong to the 
state. Most historical buildings are privately owned, but some, especially ancestral halls, are state 
owned. Stated-owned properties have been given to tourism companies as attractions, and the 
companies have taken charge of their preservation. Companies have also rented some privately 
owned houses for conversion into tourist attractions. Private properties not rented by the 
companies, however, remain the responsibility of the individual owners. It is in this last group 
where tension is experienced because of the conflicts between the Real Right Law and the 
Cultural Relics Preservation Law. According to the Real Right Law, local owners have property 
rights allowing them to use, change, convert, alter, raze, and/or sell their buildings. However, 
according to the preservation law, owners cannot alter their buildings if they were built before 
1911. This legal overlap has fueled tensions among local residents who want to alter or rebuild 
their houses but who cannot because it is illegal under one of the laws. Furthermore, this overlap 
leaves latitude for local governments to implement either or both of the laws. More details are 
revealed in the following case study chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
My research aims to combine political economy with critical tourism studies that focus on 
representation, discourse, and identity. Through this dual lens, I explore the main stakeholders’ 
role and their perceptions of tourism development; specifically I address research questions 
about the governmentality of the Chinese state in heritage tourism, government–private sector 
cooperation, and tourism’s influence on local communities. In addition, in the context of heritage 
tourism, I examine the issue of authenticity and the process of heritage designation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HONGCUN 
 
 
Figs. 3.1–3.2: Pictures of Hongcun.(By author) 
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Hongcun, a village originally settled during the Southern Song Dynasty (1131–1162) (Wang 
and Luo, 2002: 27), now has 137 historical houses (Wu, 2011). After the international success of 
the Academy Award-winning film Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (shot partially in Hongcun), 
the village began to be known for its beautiful environment and historical houses. Tourism 
development was initially undertaken by the local government and then handled by the local 
community, but it did not blossom under either group’s management. In 1997, with the 
investment promotion policy and a formal contract with the county government, a private sector 
company, Jingyi, was authorized to develop tourism in Hongcun. In 2002, the village was 
designated as a World Heritage Site, as was Xidi. Since then, tourism has boomed. In 2012, 1.3 
million people visited Hongcun village, and total ticket income was 77.56 million RMB
4
. 
Tourism production in Hongcun thus serves as a benchmark for similar historical villages 
because of its success in attracting a large number of tourists, creating employment, fueling the 
local economy, and urbanizing the local community. Thriving tourism, however, has created 
tensions within the local community. 
In this chapter, I explore the politics of Hongcun’s representation by the tourism company, 
the role of various governments in Hongcun’s designation as a World Heritage Site, and its 
tourism development. Additionally, I examine the local community’s life via information gained 
in ethnographic interviews.  
 
Hongcun on Display 
Tourists researching potential vacation destinations on the Internet with the hopes of finding 
one that is both interesting and educational, may come across the images in Figs. 3.1–3.2, whose 
caption reads, “A village in a Chinese painting.” The more detailed description claims that this 
                                                             
4
 RMB: Currency used in China. 
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place is a well-preserved village built 300–400 years ago. Tourists who become intrigued by the 
beautiful pictures and the available tourism package might contemplate making the necessary 
plans that will ultimately engage them in heritage tourism. They will arrive at Huangshan city 
and then go to Hongcun in Yi County, a 90-minute ride. After buying an entrance ticket for 104 
yuan, tourists will be assigned a tourist guide and begin the tour.  
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Map 3.1: Tourism map of Hongcun. (By author.) 
The red dashed line on the map delineates the tour route, which takes approximately 45 
minutes and includes a visit to a state-owned ancestral hall, a historical school, and four 
historical houses owned by local residents. The types of historical sites on the tour are provided 
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in Table 3.1. Classes of Historical Sites in Hongcun 
 
 
 
 
 
 (By author)  
On the Hongcun tour, why are only some sites, such as the ancestral hall and specific 
houses, put on display and not others? 
The head of public relations at Jingyi (the Hongcun tourism company) explained the 
rationale behind what sites are included in the tour: 
All the historical houses are very similar. All the historical buildings you saw have similar 
inside decoration. The tourism route we chose is the most convenient for tourists. The tourists 
who come to a historical village will stay no more than two hours. As such, we have to 
choose a competitive tourism route. Types of heritage sites shown to the tourists are not 
repeated. We chose the ancestral hall, an academic school in our history, and dwelling places 
of ordinary villagers, so tourists can see the best tourism sites. (Interview with head of public 
relations at Jingyi, 06/21/2013) 
Essentially, Jingyi designed what it saw as the perfect tourism route to show the perfect 
heritage sites to tourists. Hongcun’s local residents’ perspectives on the tourism routes are 
another story. 
Two historical sites that impressed me the most were a privately owned ancestral hall and 
one specific house. Tourists could visit both if they paid the additional gate fee charged by each 
owner. The ancestral hall’s owner decorated the building with different kinds of plaques and 
named it the Plaque Museum (Fig. 3.3).   
                                                             
5
 Others in Hongcun refer to the academy and some ancient trees.  
Type of structure Definition 
Individual house Houses built before AD 1919 (the last year of the 
Qing Dynasty) 
Ancestral hall Hall to memorialize ancestors 
Bridge Bridges built before 1919, with stories attached 
Other
5
 Ancient academies, temples, temple gates, and other 
architecture built before 1919, and old trees 
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Figure 3.3: The Plaque Museum. (By author.)  
I did not get an opportunity to interview the owner formally, but we did have an informal 
conversation. He purchased the house at a fairly low price during an auction held by the Yi 
County government in the 1990s. He did not join the tourism company and open his house to 
tourists on the formal tour route because he did not like the contract proposed by the company, 
especially the small share of money it offered.  
The owner of another historical house that impressed me shared a similar reason for not 
being on the tour. His house appeared to have much potential as a unique tourist attraction, but it 
was not on the company’s tour. The owner became very agitated and angry during the interview 
when providing the following explanation:  
I refuse to cooperate with the tourism company. We will lose part of our freedom if we join it. 
It gives you only a small amount of money, just like a candy wrapper without the real candy. 
You can only imagine the sweet. Every day, there will be 30,000 people. We cannot afford 
that. It would cost 3,000 yuan each month to hire a cleaning person and a door guard. Tourists 
are all cheated. They could see more than 100 houses, but now, fewer than five houses are 
shown; only three of them are privately owned. All the houses shown by the company are 
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those joining its tourism plan. The tourism company pays the private owner thousands of 
yuan each month. (Interview with a local senior villager, 06/06/2013) 
Jingyi chose approximately seven historical houses to show to tourists; the number was 
limited because of the tour’s 45-minute duration. The selection of which houses are included is 
based on negotiations between homeowners and the tourism company, not on an assessment of 
historical value. Those negotiations constitute an economic activity. The demand of the company 
and the supply of houses available from local villagers make up the heritage shown to tourists.  
Once designated as World Heritage Sites, Xidi and Hongcun became very famous and 
attracted thousands of tourists wishing to visit the special architectural and village forms built 
according to the traditional Chinese philosophy of feng shui. These two villages have dominated 
the heritage tourism industry in the city of Huangshan over the past 20 years. Jingyi sought to 
find something new or unique to stimulate tourism even further. As a World Historical Site, 
Hongcun cannot be largely altered, so the tourism company developed a historical pageant based 
on a real story in the village’s history, titled Hongcun A Ju (宏村阿菊).(See Fig. 3.4)  
 
Figure 3.4: Hongcun A Ju. (By author.)  
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The head of public relations at Jingyi summarized the story for me: 
A Ju is a real person in the region’s history whose picture is hung on the wall of the ancestral 
hall. She designed the water system in Hongcun and built an ancestral hall. She was an 
awesome Huizhou female, especially given that females are not recognized as having status 
in ancient China. Hongcun A Ju shows that she is not a passive female but a strong and wise 
Huizhou female. It is produced by a professional team [Canada Show Company]. (Interview 
with Jingyi’s head of public relations, 06/21/2013)  
The story portrayed in the play is that of a married woman whose husband goes out of town 
for business; after he leaves, the woman gives birth to a baby, whom she raises to become a 
knowledgeable person. In addition, A Ju is portrayed as a strong woman who even fights off 
robbers during the time her husband is away.  
The story stresses that the Huizhou woman was very brave and could raise the whole village 
during her husband’s absence, but her main goal and happiness were possible only through her 
reunion with her husband, which is consistent with depictions of women in the Ming Dynasty. It 
is interesting that, at a time when Chinese women’s social status is increasing, the show 
developed in Hongcun however focuses on the service role of women in ancient times. The play 
is very unique and piques people’s interest and curiosity. 
Recrafting a true story from history to create uniqueness is a strategy to attract tourists; 
constructing or embellishing certain aspects of a historical fact while silencing others becomes 
part of tourism development. Similar to the cartographic silence of propaganda maps, designers 
hide facts they do not want people to notice (Monmonier, 1991).  
The performance also raises the issue of the relationship between heritage and history. 
David Lowenthal argues that heritage is something that is packaged for certain purposes while 
history is a selective description by historians using standard techniques based on principles of 
science and truth (Lowenthal, 1985). Historians have a set of standard rules and technologies, 
such as archeology, to illustrate facts in history, while heritage is constructed by people in 
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various roles for different purposes. Heritage cannot necessarily to be objective, scientific, or 
true. People depicting heritage use stories based on history to increase credibility, to make the 
narrative sound real, and thus to serve their purposes. There are circumstances in which people 
construct heritage out of nowhere or nothing; when they need a story to brand a location but 
there are no unique events in the place’s history, they may create a story.  
To increase the profitability of tourism, Jingyi constructed this historical pageant to 
represent Hongcun, which is unique (for now) in its heritage tourism in the Huangshan area. One 
must ask, however, how was Jingyi able to build a big stage near Hongcun to hold this historical 
pageant if preservation regulations do not allow for substantial changes/construction to occur 
based on its World Heritage Site status. The answer involves the roles of various governments. 
They allowed Jingyi to buy forested or agricultural lands so they could be cleared to build a hotel 
and a stage near the historical village. The president of Jingyi, Huang Nubo, claimed these lands 
are an investment that would lead to more profits from real estate than tourism income. As such, 
the roles of various governments need to be explored in terms of tourism development and the 
designation of World Heritage Sites.  
 
Why World Heritage Site Status? 
Hongcun’s designation as a World Heritage Site largely changed its development destiny. 
During my time in the field, a series of books in a local bookstore caught my attention. Its name 
was Huizhou’s 5,000 Villages. Although I was aware of the existence of many historical villages 
in Huizhou, the number 5,000 still shocked me. Only a few villages mentioned in the publication 
were familiar to me, even though I had been to the area more than three times and have 
researched it since 2009. Why were only a few of the 5,000 villages well known? Also, why 
were only Xidi and Hongcun designated as World Heritage Sites while others were not? The 
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following is a description of Xidi and Hongcun on UNESCO’s website: 
The two traditional villages of Xidi and Hongcun preserve to a remarkable extent the 
appearance of non-urban settlements of a type that largely disappeared or was transformed 
during the last century. Their street plan, their architecture and decoration, and the integration 
of houses with comprehensive water systems are unique surviving examples.
6
 
Xidi and Hongcun villages were designated as World Heritage Sites in 2000 by satisfying 
three criteria: 
Criteria (iii): The villages of Xidi and Hongcun are graphic illustrations of a type of human 
settlement created during a feudal period and based on a prosperous trading economy. 
Criteria (iv): In their buildings and their street patterns, the two villages of southern Anhui 
reflect the socio-economic structure of a long-lived settled period of Chinese history. 
Criteria (v): The traditional non-urban settlements of China, which have, to a very large 
extent, disappeared during the past century, are exceptionally well preserved in the villages of 
Xidi and Hongcun. (From the UNESCO website) 
In this chapter, I look into the reasons why Hongcun and Xidi were designated as World 
Heritage Sites and other villages in the Huizhou region were not because of the strikingly 
different levels of tourism development between World Heritage Sites and other villages. 
Recognition and designation by UNECSO drastically changes the destiny of some historical 
villages not only by promoting tourism but also by increasing housing price.  
I began my research with archival materials. In the local chronicles of Huangshan city, I 
found a detailed description of the application process for World Heritage Site designation for 
Xidi and Hongcun. 
The proposal for Yi County applying for the WHS was first raised by an architecture 
professor at Tsinghua University in 1989. During that year, the vice mayor of Huangshan city 
visited the National Ministry of Construction and discussed the prospect of applying for 
WHS. In 1996, a group of central government officials and experts visited Xidi and Hongcun. 
They also visited many other historical villages including Chengkan and Xucun. During that 
year, the Anhui Construction Department listed Xidi and Hongcun as chosen villages for 
applying as WHS. (Local chronicles of Huangshan city, 2010: 2390–91) 
Based on information in these chronicles, the Huangshan government led and promoted this 
process, and Xidi and Hongcun seemed to be the choice from the beginning. I uncovered another 
                                                             
6
 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1002. 
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version of the designation story, however, during an interview with a town government official in 
Huangshan. He provided his thoughts on why Chengkan, another historical village, did not 
receive World Heritage Site status: 
At that time, Chengkan and Xidi had been chosen to apply for the World Cultural Heritage 
Designation. Hongcun had not been included. The first batch was to submit application 
materials to the Construction Department in Anhui Province. The upper government wanted 
us to apply, so then we applied. However, we did not give it a lot of attention and did not 
provide sound documents. Also, the natural environment in Chengkan at that time was 
terrible. The pigs and cows were everywhere. Another reason is that the village of Hongcun is 
very big. The number of local residents at that time was more than 3,000. The consideration 
at that time was not based on the value of houses or the value of Hui culture. So Chengkan 
was removed from the list and Hongcun was added to the list….We plan to apply for the 
World Cultural Heritage Site status again. (Interview with a government official, 06/06/2013) 
A long conversation with this official ensued, revealing how Chengkan government officials 
were regretful that they had been removed from the list and how difficult it is today to become a 
World Heritage Site. Besides the reasons he gave that appear in the excerpt above, he offered 
another reason, which he implied was his personal opinion. 
The leader who was responsible for making the decision of what village gets the designation 
in Huangshan city government came from Yi County, where Hongcun and Xidi are located. 
He did not inform the Chengkan government specifically how to apply for World Heritage 
Site status. But he told Hongcun how to prepare [a planning document, environment 
management and so on].  
This official felt that Chengkan was better qualified to become a heritage site than Hongcun 
based on its historical houses and culture. To him, it was the city-level government leader’s 
personal attachment to his hometown that led to the uneven treatment among different historical 
villages in the application process for World Heritage Site status. This village-level government 
official’s perceptions on the process are—like the city-level official--affected by his personal 
attachment to his home village,  but they do offer insights into the process and into local people’s 
perspective.  
Another explanation comes from a different government official, one serving in the city 
tourism administration: 
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The application for World Cultural Heritage designation has a history, and I happen to know 
this. In the early period of P.R.C., local governments did not pay attention to the WHS thing. 
Anhui province was very poor in the 1990s. The project of applying for World Cultural 
Heritage designation was assigned by the central government to Anhui provincial 
government. The Anhui provincial government assigned the project to Huangshan city. At 
first, the city government told She County to apply for it. However, the leader there was not 
interested and thought it would cost a lot of money. Then the city government told Yi County 
to apply. The government leader in Yi County was very excited about this project so they 
chose Xidi. It’s not because other villages did not meet the requirements. This process needed 
a strong government involved in it. (Interview with a government official in the city tourism 
administration, 06/21/2013) 
Similar to the government official in Chengkan, this official stressed the role of government 
officials in charge of county government at that time.  
Other perspectives exist as well. For example, the director of the city Cultural Relics Bureau 
explained the process as follows: 
During that time, I worked in the office that was in charge of the process. We had somewhere 
between three and five potential villages. Xidi and Hongun were chosen because they had 
plans. Xidi made a plan in 1997, and Hongcun made a plan in 1998. Other villages in 
Huangshan city did not have plans. It is required by UNESCO to have a plan to get in. At that 
time, governments did not have the idea of making plans. Nowadays, every village has a plan, 
like Nanping village and Tangyue village. So other villages, such as Chengkan, were taken 
out of consideration because of this reason. (Interview with the head of city Cultural Relics 
Bureau, 06/21/2013) 
Although this interviewee believes that Xidi and Hongcun were chosen because they had 
plans in placein 1997 and 1998, the local chronicles of Huangshan city show that the city 
government chose Xidi and Huangshan in 1996. At that time, Yi County government officials 
made a preservation plan for these two villages.  
Making a preservation plan is the basis for applying for WHS. Yi County government then 
entrusted the Huangshan City Planning Design Institute to make the plan in 1997 and 1998. 
(Local chroncles, Huangshan, 2010:2391) 
This quote contradicts what the head of City Cultural Relics Bureau said; it is not because 
Xidi and Hongcun had a preservation plan that they were chosen. Instead, they were chosen first, 
and that is what led them to make the preservation plan. Applying to be a World Cultural 
Heritage Site is truly a top-down national government-led process, but the selection was made by 
the Anhui provincial government, and city - and county-level governments in Huangshan. 
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Whether the designation of World Cultural Heritage Site was granted because of some leaders’ 
personal attachment cannot be proven, but it is definitely a government-led process. Also, the 
selection is based not solely on heritage value but on county governments’ preference.  
 
An Absent Government 
I did not interview local government officials in Hongcun because none were available. 
When I went to the government office in Hongcun village, some television reporters were 
interviewing the top officials.  A lower-level person assisted me, but had little information. This 
situation led me to speculate that the village government officials  here are seemingly absent—
not only because I did not gain any useful information from them or their employees, but also 
because they have clearly delegated much of their work in tourism development to the tourism 
company. Ultimately, I found that the tourism company played a much more obvious role in 
tourism development than the local government.  
Jingyi developed tourism freely at Hongcun, like in a free market, because it had approval 
from the local government. This situation is related to the art of governance; as Foucault 
discusses in The Birth of Biopolitics, the issue is not whether there is any governance but rather 
how and to what extent government becomes involved with economic activities. The seemingly 
absent role of Hongcun government in tourism development is explored in terms of its art of 
governance. 
The tourism development process in Hongcun village is provided in detail in Tianyu Ying 
and Yongguang Zhou’s 2007 article; it is summarized in Table 3.2-3.3.
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Table 3.2: History of Hongcun’s Tourism Development: 1986–1999. 
Year Event Brief description 
1986–-
1988 
Tourism was initiated by the 
Tourism Bureau of Yi County. 
Conducted by the Tourism Bureau of Yi County; only two view 
spots were opened with a ticket price of 4 cents; no payment to 
the local; the potential for tourism had not been recognized by 
the community. 
1994–-
1995 
The community tried to 
dominate tourism 
development. 
The local residents recognized the potential values of the 
village; villagers’ committee submitted reports to town and 
county authorities asking for a self-appointed tourism program, 
but the request was rejected. 
1996 The town authority controlled 
Hongcun’s tourism 
development. 
The villagers’ committee of Hongcun requested again; tourism 
development was assigned to the town authority; a town-owned 
corporation was founded in June, but it was depreciated by the 
community. 
1997 A community-owned tourism 
corporation was founded. 
The community contracted the right of tourism operation with 
the town authority for one year with a guarantee of about 
US$3,720; a community-owned tourism corporation was 
founded in January, and a senior villager took the position of 
general manager. 
1998 An external company 
controlled tourism 
development and fired the 
indigenous tour guide. 
The community’s tourism business failed, the county 
government withdrew operational rights and transferred them to 
an external company—Jingyi Company, with several provisos 
outlying to Hongcun’s tourism business, including developing 
tourism in adjacent villages, taking over a county-owned hotel 
and travel agency, etc. Jingyi Corporation was founded by 
Jingyi to take charge of Hongcun’s tourism business for 30 
years beginning in January. During the year, the indigenous tour 
guides were replaced by a group of nonlocal young girls.
7
  
1999 The external company 
reached a deal with the 
community on benefit 
allocation. 
Jingyi Corporation, the community, and the tourism authority of 
the town came to an agreement in August to regulate tourism 
revenue allocation; after paying the community a fixed 
US$21,118 every year, the company would take away 95 
percent of the ticket income with very limited investments, 4 
percent would be given to the local township government, and 
only 1 percent to the community. 
 (Reproduced from Ying and Zhou, 2007: 101)  
Tourism development was originally the responsibility of the county-level government 
corresponding to the TVEs time period; later it was transferred to the local community. After the 
TVE’s failure in the market and the creation of policies encouraging private sector involvement, 
                                                             
7
 When I conducted fieldwork in 2013, Jingyi claimed that 90% of its employees were local villagers [“local” means 
Yi County]. This was confirmed by a tour guide who told me that most of them were from Hongcun village. 
 
48 
 
an external company took over the rights to develop tourism in Hongcun via a form of rental 
contract. In 1997, the government of Yi Country signed a contract with Jingyi, a Beijing 
company with capital accumulated from real estate. An employee of Jingyi explained the process 
the company went through to become involved in tourism development: 
Jingyi Company got into Yi County through the leadership of the Yi County government. 
During that time, every region in China had a project for investment promotion. With that 
backdrop, our boss came here and was attracted to this region. Then, he signed a contract 
with the government in Hongcun village, as well as with the governments of some other 
historical villages, such as Nanping village and Guanlu village. [These three villages are all 
located in Yi County.] We have been running the tourism business in Hongcun since 1998, 
with a contract to rent the village for 30 years. It has been 15 years. (Interview with the head 
of public relations at Hongcun, 06/21/2013) 
Investment promotion has been an important strategy taken by the Chinese government in 
its Open and Reform Policies which is influenced by political economic conditions outside and 
inside of China. The original capital accumulation of Jingyi was from investments in the real 
estate industry in Beijing in 1997, when it earned more than 50,000,000 yuan (roughly 
US$6,250,000 at that time
8
). Huang Nubo, president of Jingyi, was originally a government 
official but resigned his position to participate in economic activities in 1990. This phenomenon 
of moving from government into the private economic sector was very common given the 
influence of the market in China during that time. This phenomenon—of government officials 
resigning their positions and moving into the private sector—is called Xiahai, which means ‘to 
step into the (market) sea to begin adventures.’ Apparently, Huang Nubo adapted well to his new 
environment and earned his initial fortune in real estate. Later he took on tourism development in 
Hongcun because of, first, a personal relationship with government officials in Yi County and, 
second, his personal interest in cultural relics.
9
 
Jingyi’s growth path is closely related to the political economy in China. First, its founding 
                                                             
8
 This amount is calculated according to the exchange rate in 1997—US$1 = 8 yuan. 
9
 http://www.techweb.com.cn/commerce/2009-12-17/499438.shtml 
 
49 
 
would not have been possible before the beginning of the Open and Reform policies in 1979. 
Only with the encouragement of the central government could it participate in economic 
activities after that time. Also, Huang Nubo could earn his original fortune only because of the 
emergent real estate industry. In 1990, China issued policies on housing that allowed houses in 
cities to be commoditized. Prior to 1990, ‘working units’
10
 built houses and allowed employees 
to live in them at no cost. After 1990, houses were privatized, and anyone could buy an 
apartment (He and Wu, 2009). Thus, stakeholders such as Huang Nubo earned their original 
capital in this process. 
Given both the company’s accumulated capital and favorable government policies that 
promoted investment by encouraging polities to engage the private sector in tourism, Jingyi 
Company stepped into tourism development in Hongcun.  Critical was Huang Nubo’s personal 
friendship, guanxi, with Yi County government officials. This represents a common informal 
relationship between government officials and entrepreneurs in China (Wang and Ap, 2013). As 
mentioned, the central government greatly encouraged tourism development in Huangshan city 
because it was a way to increase economic growth (Zhang, Chong, and Ap, 1999; Xiao 2006). 
The monetary aspect is key, evident in part of Deng Xiaoping’s speech in Huangshan city in 
1979:  
What brings money first is what we should do.
11
 Foreigners will be unsatisfied if they spent 
less money on tourism in China. The employees need to be paid according to their labor 
quality and labor time. Nine hundred million people cannot get rich at the same time. It has to 
be some region that gets rich first. Within that region, it has to be some people who get rich 
first. The foreign income from tourism needs to be shared with local government. To initiate 
tourism, the central government also needs to invest.
12
 
This kind of uneven development is the foundation of investment promotion. After Jingyi 
took over tourism development in Hongcun, it built infrastructure, such as roads, parking lots, a 
                                                             
10
 Working units are stated-owned entities, such as companies, government sector agencies, and public schools. 
11
 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/9644320.html. 
12
 http://www.ah.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2009-06/30/content_16953827.htm. 
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hotel, and an outside stage for the historic pageant. Although it is natural for a tourism company 
to develop infrastructure to support tourism, Jingyi gained attention because its infrastructure 
projects all have taken place with the approval of local government officials. 
Building infrastructure required obtaining agricultural land. Land in China—especially 
agricultural land—is strictly controlled by governments. The City Planning Law dictates that 
agricultural lands be strictly controlled, especially when the developer plans to change land 
use.
13
 However,  local government officials, who had been granted power from the central 
government (consistent with the redistribution of power corresponding to neoliberal trends 
discussed in previous chapter), made it possible to take local villagers’ agricultural land to build 
such things as roads, parking lots, and hotels. 
Local governments show a positive attitude toward tourism development, and their behavior 
can be understood through Foucault’s discussion on governmental reason: “Government, at any 
rate, government in this new governmental reason, is something that works with interests” 
(Foucault, 2008: 44). Local governments, including those of Yi County, Jilian town, and 
Hongcun village, all protect tourism development in Hongcun to suit their interests.  
For local government leaders, the primary goal is to ensure promotion during their political 
career (Silamu and Seyiti, 2007). Under the Local Government Official Performance Evaluation 
System, the constraints faced by local governments mainly derive from upper-level governments. 
Thus, getting support from that upper level is especially important in local government officials 
keeping their jobs and pursuing promotion opportunities. This support can be gained in two ways: 
increasing the local GDP and establishing/maintaining social stability (Silamu and Seyiti, 2007). 
Tourism is seen as a way to pursue GDP growth. 
                                                             
13
 http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34354.htm. 
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With the Tax Distribution System established in 1994, local governments share tax income 
with the central government. However, local entrepreneurs’ income taxes belong to the local 
government (Liu, 2010). Thus, the local government seeks not only to increase GDP but also to 
obtain more tax income from local entrepreneurs. Because the government wants economic 
growth and believes the tourism company can greatly help increase the GDP and tax income, it 
works to remove any obstacles blocking Jingyi’s efforts to develop tourism.  
 
Local Community 
As mentioned, Jingyi Company used local villagers’ agricultural land to build infrastructure. 
According to one older female villager, the government forced the local villagers whose 
agricultural land coincided with areas Jingyi wanted to develop to sell their lands for a certain 
price. To make the local villagers sell their land, the government granted favors, of a sort. For 
example, one senior villager explained that she received permission to install a bigger window 
on the outside wall of her house for better light, a renovation that would not have been allowed 
under preservation regulations. Other villagers could not broaden their windows as she did, but 
she was allowed because she sold her land. It is evident that both tourism development and the 
Cultural Relics Preservation Regulation have largely affected, and in some cases possibly 
transformed, local residents’ lives.  
While staying in Hongcun, several things about the local villagers impressed me. I selected 
local villagers to interview based on who was available at the time and who agreed to be 
interviewed. I formally interviewed 11 local residents in Hongcun; most were store owners and 
senior villagers. The two I chose for the case studies were both senior villagers; they had much 
more time available and were willing to talk with me for more than one hour.  
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Case Study 1: A Grandfather 
This man was quoted earlier in this chapter about the reasons why his house was excluded 
from the tourist route designed by the tourism company. That his house was a point of interest 
was made known by local villagers, not by the tourism company’s website or brochures. He 
refused to cooperate with Jingyi because of the low price it offered as compensation. As a result, 
he—as a small entrepreneur inside the historical village—charged 5 yuan (less than US$1) as a 
gate fee to visit his house. In addition, he offered green tea to visitors.  
Interviewee: Our ancestor is [a] doctor. Brothers divided the house and each son inherited 
one part of it.
14
 The original house was built in the Qing Dynasty during Emperor Wanli’s 
reign. Many parts got damaged. The so-called preservation by government did not make any 
difference. Everything [about the house] is our own. That’s why we charged a gate fee in 
front of the house; otherwise, we wouldn’t do that. Preservation has nothing to do with 
tourism development for us. We found the profit distribution system to be unreasonable so we 
did not agree to work with Jingyi. 
We got nothing form Jingyi! Tourists come to visit historical architecture (instead of 
agricultural land). Our dwelling place is a historical house; however, they did not include us 
in the distribution system. They [Jingyi] did not pay us so why should we serve them? The 
host community got 5 percent of the gate fee. This is ridiculous. The host community is 
supposed to get 51 percent while they get 49 percent.  
Yi: The 5 percent is shared by the whole host community? That is 2,700 yuan [US$430] per 
capita right?  
Interviewee: 2,700 yuan per capita only refers to farmers. Only people who hold agricultural 
lands could participate in that benefit sharing. If you do not hold agricultural land, you would 
get nothing. (Interview with the senior villager, 06/03/2013) 
Information disclosed during this conversation contradicted my knowledge of the benefit-
sharing system in Hongcun. Through various other interviews, I got the impression that every 
villager in Hongcun got 2,700 yuan in 2012, but this was not the case according to this villager. 
His family did not hold agricultural lands so could not share in the profits. He continued 
explaining the arrangement.  
                                                             
14
 In ancient China, only sons could inherit family property; daughters were married into other families. After the 
parents passed away, each son received part of the property.  
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The tourism company could give more to the farmers, but it is unreasonable to give nothing 
to those of us who do not hold farm lands. This is a sail under false colors. (Interview with 
the senior villager, 06/03/2013) 
The man’s dissatisfaction with Jingyi extended to the local government. In this part of the 
conversation, he mentioned the conflict between the host community and the tourism company 
or the government. This conflict was reported by a journalist in Southern Weekly. Later, the 
Southern Weekly apologized to the tourism company, and the journalist was fired.  The 
grandfather explained:  
The corruption is like a cancer in our society. The government officials got lots of money and 
benefits from Jingyi Company, which makes them turn a blind eye to what the company did. 
Sometimes, the government would hire people to suppress the local villagers if they quarreled 
with Jingyi Company. The company has bribed different sectors, but. there is no use to report 
it to the public. For example, when the Southern Weekly reported the conflict, the upper-level 
government replaced the local government officials while the local situation remained the 
same. They even changed the editors at Southern Weekly. (Interview with the senior villager, 
06/03/2013) 
The conflict reported in the Southern Weekly newspaper was about the leasing of Hongcun 
to Jingyi; the contract was between the company and the Yi County government rather than the 
government in Hongcun village. The contract required Jingyi to pay the government 170,000 
yuan every year; 95 percent of the income would belong to Jingyi, 4 percent to the Jilian town 
government, and 1 percent to the Hongcun village government. In addition, the company had to 
pay the Yi County government 1,600,000 yuan to compensate for the losses incurred by a hotel 
that was run by the government.
15
 
Local residents were angry with this contract and felt they had been sold out without their 
knowledge. They took many actions to resist tourism development. The head of Jingyi’s public 
relations department stated, 
After 2000, Hongcun became a World Heritage Site designated by UNESCO. The annual 
income from the tourism gate fee increased from 170,000 yuan to millions of yuan. The local 
villagers thought they were cheated (because they were jealous). So they blocked the route of 
the tourism bus, put the excrement of their livestock at tourism sites such as the ancestral hall 
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 Information cited from “ Pain of Hongcun” in Southern Weekly, available in Chinese online at 
http://you.ctrip.com/travels/huangshan19/733645.html 
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and the academy. They greatly impeded tourism in Hongcun. So our boss signed another 
contract with the local government in Hongcun village that 67 percent of the annual income 
from tourism belongs to the company, 20 percent goes to the Hongcun Heritage Preservation 
Foundation, 5 percent goes to the local villagers, and 8 percent goes to the Hongcun town 
government. (Interview with Jingyi’s head of public relations, 06/21/2013) 
According to the report in Southern Weekly, local villagers not only put excrement at the 
heritage sites but also accused the Yi County government and Jingyi of abusing their property 
rights.  
Table 3.3: History of Hongcun’s Tourism Development: 2000–2002 
Year Event Brief description 
2000 The locals requested the 
tourism developmental rights 
back again, but failed. 
More than 300 villagers gathered in November and 
later submitted a report to the county government, 
requesting the tourism business back. The county 
government rejected the community’s request and 
claimed the right of tourism development should be 
separated from the community’s ownerships of the 
historic structures and should belong to the 
governments.  
2001 730 villagers appealed to the 
court. 
More than 730 villagers (over 60 percent of the local 
population) signed an appeal to the Anhui Provincial 
Court in September, indicating the county 
government’s encroachment of their rights in tourism, 
after having their first appeal denied by the Court of 
Huangshan City in July; the community’s second 
attempt failed. 
2002 A new agreement on revenue 
allocation was achieved. 
After several rounds of negotiation, the main 
stakeholders reached a new agreement on tourism 
revenue allocation; Jingyi Company would receive 67 
percent of the ticket income, the county government 
20 percent, the local township government 5 percent, 
and the community 8 percent. The locals received 
US$37 per capita at the end of that year, but some 
residents were still unsatisfied.  
 (Reproduced from Ying and Zhou, 2007: 101.)  
By 2013, when I was in the area to do fieldwork, most locals received US$430 per capita, but 
only those who held a hukou (household register) in Hongcun village could receive this benefit. 
Therefore, not only were those who received the money dissatisfied with the small amount of 
money, but those excluded from receiving the benefit were angry, such as the grandfather I 
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interviewed.  
 
Case Study 2: A Grandmother 
After acquiring this woman’s permission to interview her, we sat in front of her house, 
where she often sat selling souvenirs and water (I mention her in my introductory chapter), and 
we chatted about her life and the village. During our conversation, tourists stopped by to buy 
souvenirs or to ask for directions to certain tourist sites; we would stop our conversation so she 
could assist them. She explained her situation. 
In 1999 I sold my agricultural land to the tourism company to build a parking lot for tour 
buses at the price of 8,000 yuan per mu
16 
(roughly $7,762 per acre). They asked what my 
stipulations were to sell my land. I said I wanted to make the window of my house bigger. 
The government approved it. Usually, to alter the outside of the house, we need to apply to 
the local government, and we need to pay a deposit. If the house turns out OK, the deposit 
will be returned; if not, the deposit will never be returned. Since I did not have the land to 
cultivate anymore after selling it to the tourism company, I got a job with the company to 
clean the road in the village. Then when I got older, I started to just sit in front of my house to 
sell souvenirs. (Interview with a local senior villager, 06/21/2013) 
The locals were not only restricted in relation to alternations to their historical houses, but 
they were also forced to change their occupation and lifestyle: from engaging in agriculture to 
working for the local tourism company, which is categorized as a service industry.   
According to one tourist company employee, more than 90 percent of the local villagers are 
engaged in tourism services, running family inns or restaurants or selling souvenirs, for example. 
It is much easier to earn money working in these jobs than engaging in agriculture. The 
employee also mentioned that at the beginning of tourism development, the local community was 
against tourism because they could not raise cattle near their houses and their behaviors were 
under strict surveillance. Local villagers have since changed their opinions of tourism, according 
to this employee, who explained that villagers’ attitudes changed naturally as time went on and 
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as acceptance of tourism grew. Once the locals recognized the benefits, they changed their minds 
and altered their traditional lifestyle.  
They still raise pigs, but not many. They have already changed their way of life. More than 90 
percent of the people directly or indirectly engage in the tourism industry. They opened 
Happy Farmer Inns or restaurants, or are selling souvenirs. This can make much more money 
than what they could earn working as migrant workers in big cities. The local villagers also 
make more money through tourism than through agriculture. Money comes in faster. 
(Interview with Jingyi employee, 06/21/2013) 
During interviews with local villagers in Hongcun, most of them mentioned their 
agricultural lands had been taken over by the government and sold to Jingyi to build modern 
infrastructures to serve tourism. As a result, their lifestyle changed. Following is an excerpt from 
an interview revealing how local lives were transformed. 
We local villagers got used to the fact that the government took our agricultural lands. After 
several years, we got some benefit from tourism development by receiving some money from 
the gate fee and doing some small business in front of our own houses. Some villagers whose 
family lacked young labor would rent their house to others to run as family inns for the price 
from around 30,000 yuan to 60,000 yuan per year [roughly US$4,777–$9,554]. There are 
more than 100 family inns in our village. We are allowed to open family inns on the tourist 
routes but not to sell souvenirs in front of private houses on the tourist routes. My house is 
not on the tourist routes, so I can put stuff on the outside in front of it. The local government 
has assigned a group of young people to monitor that we don’t do business on tourist routes. 
They look like militiamen (Interview with a local senior villager, 06/21/2013).  
Tourism has frequently been seen by government and planning officials as an opportunity to 
stimulate the local economy, attract foreign investment, produce employment, and introduce 
modern values and lifestyles (Telfer, 2002, quoted in Palomino-Schalscha, 2012: 189). Scholars 
have also pointed out that tourism can induce “urbanization, industrialization, nation-state 
building and the replacement of traditional patterns of thoughts and beliefs with a notion of 
scientific economic rationality” (Willis and Kumar, 2009: 112, quoted in Palomino-Schalscha, 
2012: 189).  
In summary, the local residents’ lives have been largely transformed by tourism development 
and the strict Cultural Relics Preservation Law. Some locals have appropriated heritage 
themselves by selling souvenirs or creating tourist displays on or around their homes (when 
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allowed), while many transform their dwelling places into family inns. These changes are 
reflections of a booming tourism industry in Hongcun, an industry initiated by local government 
and approved by central government. The designation of World Cultural Heritage Site also 
promotes heritage tourism in Hongcun. Overall, Hongcun serves as a benchmark for adjacent 
villages desiring development. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHENGKAN 
  
 
 
Figures 4.1–4.2: Photos of Chengkan. (By author.)  
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Located in Huizhou County, adjacent to Yi County, Chengkan has a history reaching back 
more than 1,100 years. According to a member of the Luo clan, some of his ancestors migrated 
here from Jiangxi province to avoid warfare. Chengkan’s village structure is based on 
“unification of Yin (Cheng) and Yang (Kan), unification of Human and Nature” (Wu, 2011). 
With its unique village structure, more than 30 historical houses built during the Ming Dynasty, 
and 140 houses built during Qing Dynasty, Chengkan became another potential village for 
heritage tourism (Wu, 2011). As such, tourism development was first undertaken by the local 
town government. After failing in the market and perceiving Hongcun as the benchmark, 
Chengkan’s government focused on attracting external capital to invest in tourism.  
With local government's support, a local tourism company, the Chengkan Eight Diagram17 
Village Tourism Company, was organized, and Chengkan was branded as the "No. 1 Feng Shui 
Village." To compete with Hongcun, representations of Chengkan were largely transformed 
through the selection and reconstruction of various heritage sites. This highlighted the issue of 
identity for the local community, which sought to have accurate depictions of their village’s 
history on display. At the same time, strict cultural relics preservation regulations were imposed, 
provoking tensions.  
 
Chengkan on Display 
As a tourist seeking authenticity, one may be disappointed with the commodification of 
Hongcun. As a Hongcun tourist said to me, "I would recommend you to go to Nanping, where 
there are not as many tourists." With a smaller number of tourists but similar cultural assets, 
Nanping seems to offer some foreign tourists the chance to experience what they believe to be a 
more authentic setting. For the same reason, that tourist also recommended Chengkan. Tourists 
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 Eight Diagrams is a diagram used in feng shui. 
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may anticipate that Chengkan will be very different and more authentic. Initially, they will find 
some similarities, such as the required gate fee and a 40–45-minute's tour with an assigned 
tourist guide. 
 
Map 4.1: Tourism map of Chengkan. (By author.)  
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Tourists are guided through the village along a pre-established route, shown with the dashed 
line on the map, stopping at the specific places highlighted on the map: three individual houses, 
an old bridge, and an ancestral hall. Questions arise again about other houses that are not on the 
tour and about the blank and gray places on the map.  
Chengkan seemed to have a much more obvious selection process, with a small number of 
heritage sites on display, than Hongcun. In Hongcun, the houses on the tour tended to be either 
nationally owned houses, houses whose property rights were transferred during the land reform
18
 
period, or private houses contracted by the tourism company. However, in Chengkan, some state-
owned property was excluded from the tourist route, such as a big ancestral hall. The village 
owns two ancestral halls, and their destinies are very different. One is open to tourists and the 
other is not. Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 show the two halls. 
 
Figure 4.3: Ancestral hall open to tourists: Bao Lun Ge. (By author.) 
                                                             
18
 Land reform here refers to the Land Reform Law of P.R.C. issued in 1950. It mainly transformed land ownership. 
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Figure 4.4: Ancestral hall not open to tourists. (By author.)  
Fig. 4.4 shows a bigger hall, which was the main ancestral hall in Chengkan. Based on its 
role in history and its location at the entrance to the village, one would expect it to be on the 
route, but it is not. It was in a state of disrepair, and the tourism company—or the government—
claimed it did not have money to fix and maintain it. Based on an informal conversation with a 
student from East China Normal University who also conducted fieldwork in Chengkan, the 
government fixed only those heritage sites that required the least amount of work and cost. As a 
result, this big ancestral hall stood forgotten, eroding as time passed.  
Even though this big hall is located near the entrance to the historical village, few tourists 
notice it, in part because it is not highlighted by the tour guide and in part because its back faces 
the entrance, making it look like a wall from that vantage point. This spatial arrangement made it 
possible for the Chengkan Eight Diagram Village Tourism Company to ignore it.  
Another state-owned property excluded from the route is a stone bridge located outside the 
village. One local villager said that, according to folklore, the bridge has gold inside: if 
Chengkan were ever in trouble, villagers could dig out the gold to save the whole village. This 
suggests that the old bridge is recognized as an important heritage site by local villagers. 
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However, because the bridge is not located within the village boundary and would add time to 
the tour, it was not chosen as an attraction. It appears that time efficiency is more important than 
true historical value. Exclusion of both the larger, more historically relevant ancestral hall and 
the stone bridge illustrates some of the influential criteria in tourist site selection. Buildings are 
more likely to be chosen if they are in better structural shape, and structures, in general, that are 
spatially closer to other heritage sites are favored. 
To compete with Hongcun, planners for Chengkan had to find or develop the village’s own 
unique characteristic or focus. The main marketing strategy was to emphasize the feng shui 
philosophy, a traditional Chinese philosophy that frames the world with two factors: yin and 
yang. Later, it was used by some to predict the future and to avoid difficulties in life. The 
Chengkan Eight Diagram Village Tourism Company adopts several methods to emphasize and 
manipulate the feng shui philosophy all around Chengkan. It tries to make Chengkan very unique 
by connecting the concept of feng shui to the surrounding terrain. The tourist guide explained it 
to the tourists specifically according to Zhouyi, a classical book on feng shui philosophy.  
A monument at the entrance to Chengkan details how the village situates its feng shui (Fig. 
4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: The Eight Diagrams Monument. Its script reads, The village lies in natural chart of Eight Diagrams custom, 
corresponding to the innate Eight Diagrams. The whole village is surrounded by eight mountains, forming a congenital 
Diagrams eight position. There is a river named Zhongchun meandering through the village from the north to the south forming 
the black and white dividing line between Yin and Yang Eight Diagrams fish. (By author.) 
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Figure 4.6: Tourism planning map.
19
 
The map in Fig. 4.6 suggests how Chengkan “lies in natural chart of Eight Diagrams 
custom.” The tourism company assigned each mountain a name discussed in Zhouyi to show 
how Chengkan was developed specifically according to feng shui. For example, nearby Liwang 
Mountain was assigned the Kun diagram (坤卦), with a metaphor of the earth or the land that 
nurtures everything but does not require any return.  
The question of whether the feng shui philosophy was really considered by the ancestors or 
if it is merely constructed by the tourism company cannot be categorically answered. It does 
raise the issue of the construction of discourse and its extent, which brings to mind my visit to 
the “Holy City” in the Wichita Mountains in Oklahoma in the United States. The Holy City is a 
heritage site largely accepted by the area’s inhabitants even though it is socially constructed. A 
group of people came to the area and noticed the physical landscape perfectly matched a 
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 This picture was downloaded from http://image.baidu.com/i?ct=503316480&z=&tn=baiduimagedetail&ipn= 
d&word=%E5%91%88%E5%9D%8E%E5%85%AB%E5%8D%A6%E5%9B%BE&step_word=&ie=utf-
8&in=13035&cl=2&lm=-1&st=-
1&pn=7&rn=1&di=105250471600&ln=1977&fr=&&fmq=1385505707979_R&ic=0&s=&se=1&sme=0&tab=&wi
dth=&height=&face=0&is=&istype=2&ist=&jit=&objurl=http%3A%2F%2Fww2.sinaimg.cn%2Fmw600%2Fbffd8
882gw1e2rkcfj8v4j.jpg#pn7&-
1&di105250471600&objURLhttp%3A%2F%2Fww2.sinaimg.cn%2Fmw600%2Fbffd8882gw1e2rkcfj8v4j.jpg&fro
mURLippr_z2C%24qAzdH3FAzdH3Fojtkw_z%26e3Bojtk5_z%26e3Bv54AzdH3F8aadnAzdH3FpAzdH3FzgH08i
D7B&W512&H284&T8475&S62&TPjpg. I saw this map in a tourism planning document when I interviewed the 
employee of Chengkan’s tourism company. However, I was not allowed to take pictures. 
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topographical description in the Bible. As such, they built the Holy City and attributed each 
nearby hill with a role according to the Bible. The Holy City is obviously a cultural landscape 
that was built based on the physical landscape and its association with a story in the Bible. The 
precondition of this construction was acceptance, use, or knowledge of the Bible. The feng shui 
interpretation of the natural landscape around Chengkan may work like this; the tourism 
company, anticipating tourists driven by feng shui, imposed feng shui on it with no evidence that 
feng shui played an integral role in Chengkan’s location. This superimposition of feng shui 
principles by the tourism company is a marketing tool, one used at various heritage sites in 
Chengkan, such as the water garden. 
‘Water Garden’ is the term used to describe the entrance to the village; the area is 
constructed in the style of a garden, with a well, a few trees, and a stone monument denoting the 
place as the entrance to the village (Fig. 4.7). 
 
Figure 4.7: Water garden at Chengkan. (By author.) 
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When I arrived at the village, the tour guide explained how the water garden was designed 
according to feng shui but did not mention it had been built recently. A monument in the water 
garden with the inscription Dong Han Water Garden (东汉水口) misleads tourists by stating it 
was built during the Dong Han Dynasty; in reality, the garden came into being only very 
recently. According to an employee of Chengkan Eight Diagram Village Tourism Company:  
There are many similar historical villages, like Xidi and Hongcun. We branded Chengkan 
with feng shui. The water garden and the bridge were built recently. They suggest the Eight 
Diagrams landscape in feng shui. We advertised Chengkan as the first feng shui village in 
China, with the slogan “Visit Chengkan, have a life without difficulties” (游呈坎一生无坎). 
In Chinese，“difficulty” is the same character as Kan in the name of Chengkan. ... Our boss 
knows feng shui very well. He had an ancestor who was a feng shui expert. I heard that it was 
designed by him. (Interview with employee of the tourism company, 06/07/2013)  
This interview revealed that Chengkan had difficulty competing with Hongcun and Xidi 
because they have the World Heritage Site status, so the tourism company in Chengkan built the 
water garden and created a story to make the village unique and attractive to tourists eager for 
good luck and a life free from difficulties. They appeal to the belief that there is a mysterious 
force guiding our lives, which the Communist Party considers to be mere superstition. Karl Marx 
argued that as production increases fairytales will diminish because people will have the power 
to control nature (Harvey, 1990). The Communist Party directed citizens to believe in 
communism rather than religion. However, the local government did not regulate the tourism 
company’s feng shui marketing because it did not cause any problems.  
My interviews revealed that what is important to the government is how to support the 
tourism company in its efforts to attract more tourists. This is closely related to the policy 
direction of the central government to encourage development and to the personnel promotion 
system within the Chinese government (discussed in Chapter 3 and later in this chapter). 
Some tensions have arisen in Chengkan, however, over the new water garden. According to 
a senior villager there:  
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It’s difficult to relate to the history of the water garden where we charge the gate fee now 
[because it implicates the tourism company]. In 2005, it was fertile agriculture land. The 
stone monument and the bridge are on what was agricultural land and now is called the Dong 
Han Water Garden. The center of our country was at Xi’an during Dong Han Dynasty. 
Huizhou was a marginalized place and considered barbaric at that time. Our ancestors came 
here during the Han Dynasty as refugees to avoid wars. They could not build houses when 
they first came because they did not have that production ability.  
In those days, Chengkan was uncultivated; they had not yet formed a village or established a 
clan. That did not occur until a much later stage as a result of three large immigrations: the 
East Jin Dynasty (AD 317–420), the Late Tang Dynasty (AD 755–907), and the Song 
Dynasty (AD 960–1279). During the Han Dynasty (AD 206–220), people lived near the river 
and inside the mountain. Once they had enough capital, they started garden architecture. Even 
the garden in the empire did not emerge until the Song Dynasty (AD 960–1279), when 
Emperor Song Gaozong (AD 1107–1187) brought some stones from Yunnan province for 
aesthetic reasons. Because the empire did not build gardens until the Song Dynasty, how 
could Chengkan have a garden since the Dong Han Dynasty?  
Those houses around the water garden were all brought from different places. The 
designation about its unique feng shui and its age in Dong Han Dynasty was made by the 
tourism company. It was taken over for the price of 1,000 yuan per mu (US$26 per acre). 
(Interview with a senior villager, 06/06/2013) 
The historical water garden is somewhere else, not where Chengkan Eight Diagram Village 
Tourism Company built it. As such, not only did the company redate the water garden; it 
relocated it.  
Tourists witnessed this public conversation. I learned more in a later, private conversation 
with this same villager. (I made an appointment to interview him again when there were no 
tourists around.) He began the second conversation by stating that he would not be telling me 
this information if it were daytime and there were people around, leading me to believe this is a 
sensitive issue. 
Interviewee: Tourism is tourism, culture is culture, and villagers are villagers. There is no 
connection, no relationship among them. The tourism company aims to achieve an economic 
goal; it is not concerned with traditional cultural heritage. If the boss cared about culture and 
history, he would not have built the fake water garden. He would have built up the real water 
garden. To build the fake one, they brought some historical houses from other villages and put 
them in the water garden. It cost a huge amount of money. That amount of money would be 
enough to maintain the ecological environment and build up the real water garden.  
Yi: Who initiated this? 
Interviewee:Since they took the land, it must be the local government who did this. I think 
they did nothing to show the [traditional] culture. They built new architecture and cheated the 
tourists by telling them it was old. They lied. If they really cared about the history and the 
 
69 
 
heritage, they would not have done this and not fix the ramshackle houses or build up the real 
water garden. The big ancestor hall near the entrance to the village [discussed in a previous 
part in this chapter] was not fixed, and they cheated the tourists by using the houses they 
brought in. So I think Chengkan needs to change; it cannot stay like this. (Interview with a 
senior villager, 06/06/2013)  
The village was transformed based on the tourism company obtaining permission from the 
government to invest capital for the production of historical space. Whatever the tourism 
company could not resolve through market forces, the government stepped in to help, such as 
taking over agricultural land that belonged to local villagers to build the water garden. However, 
the tourism company has had the power to alter the telling of history by writing the script used 
by the tour guides and by advertising as it deems necessary without the government’s 
intervention.  
The head government official at the Cultural Relics Bureau was aware of the construction of 
the entrance to Chengkan village and said this construction had been approved by the 
government. 
Changes in historical villages require experts’ approval. Some changes are not allowed 
because they will alter what the village used to look like. However, to attract tourists, or to 
satisfy the demand of tourists, it can be allowed. For example, the door control system in 
Chengkan; we thought it was necessary, but it needed the approval of experts, so the tourism 
company bought the historical house so it could build a door control system. This is ok. You 
cannot always stay the same; the world is changing. (Interview with the head government 
official in the Cultural Relics Bureau in Huangshan city, 06/21/2013) 
I asked him about the water garden, but his answer focused on the door control system, 
which refers to the entrance that tourists use to get in with their tickets. This may be the language 
the tourism company used to gain approval, but it did not simply build a door control system; it 
also designed and built a water garden that contains several lakes and a bridge. The government 
controls the right to transform the historical village. The interviewed official stated that 
alterations that change history are not allowed but then continued with “the world is changing,” 
justifying the construction of the water garden in Chengkan because it served the important role 
of attracting tourists. His comment that the world is changing also implies that Chengkan needed 
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to change too.  
What is changing? As discussed in Chapter 2, in the context of globalization and a 
worldwide neoliberalism trend since the 1970s, China is currently pursuing rapid economic 
growth. To achieve this goal, it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), opened markets, 
and became socialist with Chinese characteristics, or perhaps I should say “neoliberalism with 
Chinese character” (Harvey, 2005). I argue, however, that it is a governmentality that contains 
some neoliberalism characteristics but that cannot be categorized neoliberalism.  
 
A Supportive Government: “We Want Economic Growth” 
The changing of historical villages is strictly controlled by governments according to the 
regulations found in The Protection Regulation of Historical Villages in Southern Anhui Province 
mentioned in Chapter 2. It is possible to alter historical villages with government approval. 
Clearly, city government has the power to decide which changes are allowed and which are not, a 
result of the redistribution of power from the central government. The tourism company used the 
lure of economic growth to convince county and city governments to approve its application for 
changing the historical village. Because economic growth is directly related to the personnel 
promotion system for government officials in China, the local government ultimately was easily 
convinced.  
The tourism company in Chengkan built a fake water garden and claimed that the village is 
more authentic or older than other villages and that it is more attractive because of its feng shui 
design. This construction is based on the discourse and belief that claims of authenticity increase 
profits. The local government desires economic growth to compete with other places with 
governmentality that contains neoliberalism traits, which leads it to remove obstacles impeding 
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tourism development by private companies. However, this runs counter to preservation law, 
which is meant to preserve the history of the village to satisfy tourists’ gaze (Urry, 1990). In the 
case of Chengkan, the government actually broke the law to make it easier for the tourism 
company, instead of serving as administrator or gatekeeper working on behalf of the People. This 
further supports that China is not an exclusively neoliberalgovernment, but rather that the 
country displays a mixed and combined governmentality: a strong state getting involved in 
economic activities (So, 2007). As mentioned, tourism development in Chengkan was initially 
undertaken by the local government but not profitably. Thus, in 2004, the local government 
leased the village to a private company, with a preferential policy requiring only tax revenue in 
return. An interview with a government official in Chengkan’s town government revealed the 
process well. 
Currently, we need to support the development of the tourism company; we cannot ask for 
profits. If the tourism company went broke, what benefit would the government get? We 
mainly need to let the number of tourists rise. We need to educate the local villagers not to 
focus on the small amount of benefit shared with the tourism company. We cannot achieve 
the goal that all the villagers get rich through sharing profits from the gate fee charged by the 
tourism company. Our purpose is to get all the villagers engaged in the tourism 
development….All we want is that the number of tourists rises. In the past, there were almost 
no tourists at all. Last year, we had more than 200,000–300,000 tourists. (Interview with a 
township government official in Chengkan, 06/06/2013) 
According to this official, what matters is the number of tourists. In another words, what 
matters most is the tax revenue from the money tourists bring in. The local government is very 
supportive of the tourism company, and, as this government official claimed, all the government 
wants is the tax revenue from the increasing numbers of tourists. 
Based on interviews with the local villagers in Chengkan, the villagers receive 30 yuan 
annually from the tourism company, but not as cash; it is paid in the form of health insurance 
known as the New Rural Cooperative Medical System. This is a government-run health 
insurance system for which individuals in rural China pay 60 yuan a year. The tourism company 
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leases their hometown and compensates them by paying their health insurance every other year, 
which can be seen as a form of privatization of the health system. This is in line with one of the 
major features of neoliberalism—the commodification of human services. As Guan argues, 
Whereas the Maoist state provided human services (like housing, health care, welfare, 
education, pension, etc.) on a need basis and free of charge to all citizens, the post-reform 
state treated human services as a commodity to be distributed to people on market principles. 
Beneficiaries now were to pay a part of the costs for services in most welfare fields. Such 
changes occurred in social insurance (pension, medical care and the newly created 
unemployment insurance), higher education, and many personal services. (Guan, 2000, 
quoted in So, 2007: 64). 
Compared to the 2,700 yuan per year that villagers in Hongcun receive from the Jingyi 
Company, the payment of 30 yuan a year to villagers in Chengkan is a very small amount. My 
fieldwork uncovered complaints, but they were not about sharing profits; they focused instead on 
heritage preservation and regulations controlling agricultural lands.  
Heritage preservation regulations are strictly enforced for villagers. They cannot rebuild 
their own historical houses. At the same time, however, the local government in Chengkan does 
not help fix or repair old houses even if they are dilapidated. According to a senior villager, the 
old houses look good from the outside, but they are in ruins inside. The government does not 
take care of them but strictly controls any exterior construction. According to another villager, 
the government will demolish any structure villagers build because such structures violate the 
preservation regulations in the Chengkan Historical Village Protection Regulation and 
Utilization Planning document. 
Construction Control 
1， Buildings in Chengkan should be mainly two-story structures, with strict limitations on three-
story structures, and four-story houses are forbidden. All the houses must be in Huizhou 
traditional slope roof form. 
2， The height of each floor is strictly controlled.
20
 
3， The original height of cultural relics and historic buildings must be maintained. 
4， Construction or repair of structures needs to maintain the original height and build in the 
traditional Hui sloping roof form. (Chengkan Historical Village Protection Regulation and 
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Utilization Planning, 2010: 10
21
) 
The fixed size of house plots and strict controls over height thus limits the size of houses. 
Also, the preservation regulation requires that historical houses built before 1911 must be 
preserved. If a villager wants to build a new house, the local government assigns an area where 
they can buy land and construct a new building. A local villager explains: 
Nowadays, we cannot raze our old house to build a new one; also building something else 
based on the old one is not allowed. We can only fix and preserve our house. Villagers 
complained about this. They have a big yard, but they cannot build a new house. The 
government lets you buy another property outside of the historical village. Nobody likes that. 
The government took the land with the price of 10,000-90,000 yuan while selling it to you for 
the price of 100,000–900,000 yuan. (Interview with a local villager, 06/05/2013) 
This villager also mentioned that the local government forced villagers to sell their 
agricultural land to build infrastructure that supported tourism development. This is exactly what 
happened in relation to the newly built water garden at the entrance to the historical village. 
Agricultural lands are controlled by the government; therefore, any changes made on agricultural 
land must be approved by government officials.  
The government, recognizing the competition with other villages for tourists, maintains that 
it needs to support the tourism company as much as possible. It is hard to compete with World 
Heritage Sites, such as Hongcun and Xidi in an adjacent county. 
After fail[ing] in our first application for the WHS, we tried to apply for it a second time. 
However, we never succeed[ed]. We are making efforts, our documents are complete, our 
management is good. However, it is very difficult to be included in the World Heritage list. 
Normally, a similar landscape can only apply once. So, even if we do a good job now, we 
may never succeed in becoming a WHS. It is a huge loss that we lost to Hongcun last time. 
Actually, we should be a WHS. (Interview with a government official in Chengkan town 
government, 06/06/2013) 
Compared to Hongcun, the local government in Chengkan is more determined and has a 
stronger hand in tourism development. For example, during an interview a local village 
government official told me the town and village governments also pay for the cleaning work 
                                                             
21
 I got access to this document from the Chengkan town government and took pictures of it with permission. The 
translation is mine.  
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done inside the historical village; this is in addition to what the tourism company pays. The local 
government is also responsible for security in the historical village; in Hongcun, however, this is 
done by the tourism company. This further convinced me of Hongcun town and village 
governments’ absent role.  
The villagers in Hongcun have brought a lawsuit against the tourism company and their 
local government to gain more benefits from tourism and rights to their own village. Villagers in 
Chengkan have not taken this route, even though their situation is worse. The regulation of 
heritage preservation is as strict in Chengkan as it is in Hongcun, but the benefits Chengkan 
villagers receive from the tourism company are almost nonexistent. Potential reasons for why 
Chengkan villagers have not taken the tourism company and the government to court may be that 
the local government controls the local residents more strictly and that the tourism company does 
not earn as much profit as the Jingyi Company does in Hongcun. Yet, Chengkan villagers’ lives 
are largely influenced by tourism development and the strict Cultural Relics Preservation 
Regulation.  
 
Local Community 
Case Study 1: A Decent Local Resident 
Teo and Yeoh (1997) have explored local residents’ and tourists’ perceptions of a Singapore 
heritage site that was remade for tourism. Their study shows that local residents attach memories 
to the old landscape, while tourists consider it more as a commodity. Personal attachment to 
tourism sites was especially evident with one senior villager in Chengkan. Enthusiastic about the 
local culture, he dedicates his life to studying and sharing knowledge about the lineage of 
Chengkan village.  This man frequently gives lectures to university students when they go there 
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to do fieldwork. I was fortunate to have attended one of his lectures in the summer of 2013.  
One day, approximately 20 students, including myself, sat on the floor of an ancestral hall 
while he lectured on the history of the village and its dilemma today. Highlights of his lecture 
follow. 
In the 1980s, I started to do research on Chengkan’s history. I have been here for more than 30 
years. Chengkan used to be called Longxi, which in the dictionary means the sound of water. It 
was named this because it has lots of water. People who lived here used to be primitive 
humans. In the East Han Dynasty, three families lived here: Lv, Sun, and Jin. However, they 
did not form a strong family unit and they lived together with the primitive humans. Later, the 
three families either left or disappeared. The whole village formed because of the Luo family.  
 
Later in the Late Tang Dynasty, two cousins of the Luo family came to Chengkan and settled 
down because of Chengkan’s good feng shui. Nowadays, villagers do not care about feng shui. 
As long as transportation is convenient, and their motorcycle or their car can drive into their 
yard, then it is OK. They do not want road bends in front of their house or stairs that were built 
according to feng shui of the old times. Their life tempo is very quick, and the tempo of the 
whole county is very quick. It is impossible to follow the norms of the old times. 
 
Until now, Chengkan had more than 20 historical houses from the Ming Dynasty, and more 
than 100 historical houses from the Qing Dynasty. When I was young, there were lots of 
historical houses around the big stone bridge in front of the village, which is the true water 
garden. After 1949, however, those historical buildings became state-owned property and then 
fell down because of a lack of financial aid for preservation.  
 
In 2005, a historical house built during the Ming Dynasty was torn down. The reason is very 
complex. Even though it was listed as a preservation unit by the government, financial aid was 
limited. Many other places also needed the money; for example, an ordinary house that used to 
be a family’s house. Later, the old grandpa in the ordinary house died and his sons moved out 
to build their own houses. In this case, the preservation of the old house became a problem 
because of the huge amount of money it required. When the old grandpa was still alive, all the 
sons were willing to help pay for the preservation. After he died, some sons were willing to pay 
for the preservation but some were not, because nobody would actually live in it. There are 
many other historical houses facing the same problem. Cultural relic preservation cannot 
always rely on the state since the property rights are private. Some people refuse to let the 
government repair their house, even when the state government would pay for it.  
 
Our Luo family used to have more than 20 ancestral halls with two main ancestral halls for the 
first two cousins who came here. This ancestral hall [the one in which we were listening to his 
lecture] is a branch ancestral hall of the main ancestral hall.
22
 In 1920, my grandfather was in 
charge of this ancestral hall, and from 1920 to 1949, my father was in charge. After 1949, this 
ancestral hall became the state’s property, and in 1953, it became a school. As part of the 
education system, it was well preserved, unlike other ancestral halls in the village, most of 
which got destroyed or damaged. Only four or five still exist, but they are all in a very bad 
condition, with only parts of them existing. This ancestral hall served as a school from 1953 to 
1991, and in 1991, with government investment and some private financial aid, it was repaired. 
In 1994, it was officially opened to the public.  
                                                             
22
 Branch ancestral hall: A main ancestral hall is built in memory of the first people who came to the area, while a 
branch ancestral is built in memory of a particular son or grandson in the family for his outstanding contribution to 
the family, for example, outstanding work in government or business.  
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This villager’s presentation concentrated on the history of the whole village and on the 
particular ancestor hall of his family. Throughout his talk, his enthusiasm about his past, his 
family, and his hometown was evident. If worship can be seen as emotion, then all his emotions 
toward his village showed worship of the past and silence about current developments. Today, he 
works in his family’s ancestral hall, which is state owned, researches Chengkan’s history, and 
works with the Cultural Relics Bureau to preserve his village. During the lecture, he answered a 
phone call from the Bureau about a historical house’s preservation issue. At the end of the talk, 
he briefly mentioned his own personal experience with the ancestral hall.  
When I was young, around 13 or 14, I caught fish in the river with my friends. After my father 
found this out, he made me kneel in the ancestral hall for confession. Nobody can beg for 
forgiveness for me. I knelt there in front of all my ancestors’ tablets for one day. This was an 
experience that I can never forget. My father intended to educate me to respect natural lives, the 
lives of the fish. 
His experience reflected the lives and feelings of the local elites who care about local 
culture in the development process. His passion for the culture and for teaching others about it is 
a way of constructing the meaning of his life. Through this, he connected his life with his 
ancestors’ lives and with the past of his whole community. His life became eternal by connecting 
to the past and to the future of his community, even though his actual life is limited by time 
(Wang, 2007). 
 
Case Study 2: We Need a House for Our Son’s Marriage 
Among my fieldwork sites, I found Chengkan to be the village with the most tensions 
caused by tourism development specifically because it was heavily regulated even though the 
properties were not historic as defined in government regulations discussed in Chapter 2.  
One interviewee in Chengkan spoke of the villagers’ struggle. She was watching TV in her 
store when I came in and asked for permission to interview her.  
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Interviewee: We still own a house in the historical village, but nobody lives in it now. We 
cannot alter the house now that the village is developed for tourism. Every change to the house 
needs to be made to match the old style. If the house is leaking, you are allowed to fix it in the 
old style, but other alterations are not allowed. You are responsible for your own house. For 
example, if it is going to collapse [in disrepair], you need to fix it by hiring professional 
workers. First, professional workers are very expensive. Second, if they fall off the roof, you 
are responsible for them. That is very dangerous; the house can fall down at any time. As a 
result, we just leave the house there with nobody living in it.  
 
Yi: Why not sell it? 
 
Interviewee: Nobody will buy it except the tourism company. Only the tourism company 
would buy it, but it only buys houses built before 1911. This is very annoying. For example, if 
you only have a one-story house, and your son grows up and gets married, you want to rebuild 
the house to make some space for your son, but they won’t allow that. 
  
Yi: Any compensation? 
 
Interviewee: No. If my son gets married, we need to buy an apartment in the nearby town 
called Yanzi. 
 
Yi: Don’t you have two houses? Why not let your son live in the old house located within the 
historical village? 
 
Interviewee: The old house is only good when you visit it; it is very bad to live in. The house is 
too small; it is very uncomfortable to live in. Only tourists will see it as something valuable. 
For us, it is all dusty and has very bad lighting. Sometimes, there is a ghost inside. The 
ancestral hall used to have a ghost. 
She owned two houses, one within the historical village and one outside of it but near the 
border. The house in the historical village cannot be altered without the government’s 
permission, even though it was built after 1911. If a house is near or in the historical village, it is 
highly controlled, a situation that has caused tension between the local government and villagers. 
This also reveals the legal overlap between the Cultural Relics Preservation Law and the Real 
Right Law discussed in Chapter 2, increasing the latitude for local governments when 
implementing the laws. In this case, which law gets enforced depends on the local government’s 
interest. The Chengkan local government clears obstacles for the tourism company’s efforts to 
development tourism but ignores the costs to, and property rights, of the villagers.  
Tension also arises because villagers’ land is taken in the name of tourism development; for 
example, land to build the new water garden. The government forced villagers to sell their 
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agricultural land to the tourism company for 5,000 yuan (US$796) per mu (US$4,776 per acre). 
Residents did not have a choice in this transaction; the sale of agricultural land to the tourism 
company in Chengkan is compulsory. 
Taking Hongcun as a benchmark in heritage tourism, Chengkan struggles to imitate it while 
pursuing economic growth. Unable to compete with the World Heritage Site, Chengkan’s 
tourism development remains at a lower level and cannot produce much profit to share with the 
local community. Meanwhile, strict preservation regulations are implemented. Therefore, the 
local community is in a dismal situation and struggling for better living conditions and their own 
heritage. 
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CHAPTER 5 
XUCUN 
 
 
Figures 5.1–5.2: Photos of Xucun. (By author.)  
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Hongcun serves as a benchmark in historical tourism in Huangshan city and perhaps in 
China as a whole; Chengkan is an example of tourism development in the face of competition 
with Hongcun and the perceived need for branding to make the place seem authentic or unique. 
Xucun is a totally different story. It is not famous; it does not strictly enforce the Cultural Relics 
Preservation Law; and a smaller number of tourists visit it (Table 5.1). No tensions from the local 
community have arisen surrounding tourism development, and my fieldwork went smoothly with 
the local government, local tourism company, and local community members.  
Table 5.1: Basic Information of Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun’s Tourism 
Village Tourism 
initiated 
Visitors per 
year 
Total ticket 
income 
(yuan) 
Gate fee Level of 
tourism 
attractions 
Hongcun 1998 1.3 million 77.56 
million 
104 5A 
Chengkan 2004 400,000 20.24 
million 
80 4A 
Xucun 2004 20,000 400,000 40 3A 
Information adapted from Kong (2012). Kong’s data were collected in 2012. Revisions to the year that tourism was 
initiated were made based on findings during my fieldwork in 2013. 
Located in She County, Xucun’s history reaches back more than 1,500 years. Although 
there is no record of the exact date that Xucun was established, it first became known during the 
Liang Dynasty (AD 502–587). Situated along an important road, Xucun was prosperous earlier 
in its history (Xu and Xu, 2011). Many of its historical buildings were partially or completely 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, but it still has 15 National 
Relic Protection Units and was listed as a National Historic and Cultural Town in 2008. 
Development of Xucun’s tourism began in 2003 as an investment promotion project 
initiated by the She County government. Similar to Hongcun, Xucun’s tourism company 
cooperated with local government via a contract. However, neither the company nor the 
government carried out what stated in the contract. The tourism company did not fabricate 
heritage, even in the face of the monopoly of Hongcun and Xidi and the popularity of Chengkan 
 
81 
 
in the tourism market. Its tourism script was based on archival research conducted by the head of 
the company.  
Although the Cultural Relics Preservation Law has been less rigorously enforced than the 
other two villages discussed here and has not caused tension in the local community, there still 
have been preservation problems with the historical housing stock. There is little money to 
preserve such structures and they are in a dilapidated state. Their poor condition, however, offers 
a sense of heritage and authenticity.  
 
Xucun on Display 
Having enjoyed Hongcun and Chengkan, each for its own uniqueness and the experience of 
being in these supposedly traditional landscapes, tourists may seek more historical sites, with 
more authenticity. Chengkan is certainly unique but not as authentic as some tourists may hope. 
They hear that Xucun is not a typical tourist city and does not, in fact, have many tourists, but 
that it does have some really interesting places to visit. After a one-hour drive from the center of 
Huangshan city, in a small car on an unpaved road, tourists arrive in Xucun. If they do not go 
with a group or contact the local tourism company requesting a tour guide, tourists are on their 
own. No gate fee is required for the first part of the tour, and tourists only need to pay a gate fee 
in the middle of the tour if somebody is on duty at that time tourists arrive.  
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Map 5.1: Map of Xucun. (By author.)
23
 
The side road going into the village leads to some heritage sites not included in the tour. The 
gate fee is charged at the lower intersection of the road and the river, and tourists can visit half of 
the heritage sites at no cost. The selection of tourism sites by the tourism company was based on 
the sites’ geographical location in the village.  
Most of the heritage sites designated by Xucun’s tourism company are state-owned 
property. According to the head of the company, when they signed the contract to develop 
tourism in Xucun, the local government promised that the heritage sites would be available at no 
cost and that the tourism company would only need to invest in the construction of infrastructure. 
                                                             
23
 This map was constructed based on a tourism map online and my fieldwork. 
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As suggested in Map 5.1, most of the heritage sites on display are ancestral halls, temple gates, 
temples,
24
 and bridges. Only 31.6 percent of the heritage sites are individual homes, which is 
very low compared to Hongcun (72.7 percent) and Chengkan (66.7 percent). According to the 
tour guide in Xucun, because the village was so prosperous in times past, it is hard to put all of it 
on display. Some precious ancestral halls lack money for maintenance (see, for example, Fig. 
5.3), and they are excluded because there is a relatively large number of similar structures.  
 
Figure 5.3: Ancestral hall excluded from the tour. (By author.) 
                                                             
24
 Temple gates and temples belong to the Other category in the map. 
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Putting mainly state-owned heritage sites on display (rather than several individual houses 
as done in Hongcun and Chengkan) may explain why there is no tension between the tourism 
company and the local host community. Of the three individual houses open to tourists in Xucun, 
only one is still used as a dwelling place. I did not get a chance to interview its residents. I heard 
no complaints from local villagers in Xucun about the village’s tourism development. 
Based on Harvey’s (2001) argument, entrepreneurs try to brand their products as authentic as 
a means to to compete with similar products. There is no evidence of such a strategy in Xucun, 
and many indications of poor preservation of what could easily be marketed as ‘real authentic’ 
historical houses. The Cultural Relics Preservation Law stipulates that historical houses built 
before AD 1919 cannot be rebuilt or altered, but some villagers in Xucun have rebuilt their 
houses; when questioned about this, the local government explains that human beings are more 
important than buildings. This situation puts Xucun’s tourism company in an awkward position. 
According to an interview with its head, the company labeled itself as an outsider and perceived 
that it could not get involved in the host community’s affairs because heritage preservation is the 
responsibility of the local government. 
The interview with the head of the tourism company also provided some insight into why the 
village did not got packaged for tourism in the market. When asked who wrote the tour guide 
script, he said he searched archives for accurate information.  
I went to different libraries to search for materials about Xucun, such as a genealogy book. 
Everything has to be based on historical fact. We cannot just make up stories by ourselves. If 
we did and if some authorities came, they would laugh at us. (Interview with the head of 
Xucun’s tourism company, 06/07/2013) 
This person, responsible for explaining the area’s heritage accurately, felt it was important to 
conduct proper research. His personal educational experience at the Central University of 
Finance and Economics in Beijing as an MBA student may explain his conscientious actions and 
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evidence of caring about business ethics, which is not always the case in the private sector in 
China. Some entrepreneurs have come to believe that anything that promotes profit 
maximization is rational behavior, even if it is unethical.  Furthermore, ethical behavior—if it 
cuts into profits too much—is viewed as irrational and even emotional.  Thus the head of the 
tourism company in Xucun might be viewed when he tries to behave ethically as being ruled by 
his emotions, which would be considered by some as ‘bad.’   The reason he tried to preserve the 
true history of Xucun, including the story attached to the heritage site, appears to lie in his own 
personal beliefs and sense of responsibility. This is in line with the critique of the Tourist Area 
Life Cycle Model discussed in Chapter 2:  
The model assumes that stakeholders in a destination—whether tourists or businesses—
behave rationally, investing when the “sun shines” (quite literally) and pulling out when the 
going gets tough. In reality, decision-making is rarely based on reason alone. It is governed 
by emotion, too (Gale, 2012: 42) 
Nowadays, the promotional theme that has been attached to the whole village stresses that 
Xucun is “a new socialist countryside with some historical sites.” This is a materialized 
discourse (Schein, 1997) of the negotiation of preferences of the company and the local 
government. For the sake of security, and out of desire that there be no social tension in the local 
community, and knowing that the tourism in Xucun won’t be able to compete with other villages 
like Hongcun and Chengkan, the local government has allowed Xucun villagers to repair and 
even rebuild their historical houses. Because of the government’s position and the lack of 
enforcement of the cultural relics laws, the local tourism company has let the situation develop as 
it has and has not constructed a fake site for the sake of uniqueness (or authenticity, as the 
Chengkan tourism company did).  
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Xucun’s Tourism Company: “We Are the Other” 
As described, tourism development in Xucun is very weak. I had the opportunity to 
interview the head of the tourism company because he was not busy. He explained the tourism 
development process as follows: 
We took over tourism in Xucun in 2003. The government in She County introduced us to 
Xucun’s tourism project through investment promotion. We knew the leader in She County at 
that time, and we originally came here to invest in a manufacturing factory aimed at exporting 
products to foreign countries. However, it did not work out. Then the leader in She County 
told us that there is a project related to heritage tourism. During that time, the SARS
25
 virus 
was very serious. All the tourism companies had shut down. The She County government 
gave us lots of favorable conditions. The contract stipulated that they would offer resources 
while we would invest cash to preserve the heritage and to establish the tourism area with the 
standard of 4A. All the profits would be shared with the government. (Interview with the head 
of the tourism company in Xucun, 06/07/2013) 
One statement during this interview reflected the neoliberalism trend in China: “We knew 
the leader in She County at that time, and we originally came here to invest in a manufacturing 
factory aimed at exporting products.” Alvin Y. So listed several features of the emergence of 
neoliberalism in China during the 1990s, including opening up, spatial differentiation, and the 
increase of the private sector (So, 2007: 63). These can be detected in the case of Xucun. 
The head of Xucun’s tourism company first came to She County to invest in a clothing 
factory.  The original plan to sell its products to foreign countries is closely in line with the 
neoliberalism features discussed by So. The head of the company came from the coastal area 
where his original successes with capital accumulation had occurred; he went to She County to 
establish his business because of uneven levels of development between the Anhui province and 
coastal areas; Anhui province had more favorable conditions with lower land and labor costs. 
Also, because of privatization and corporatization policies related to tourism, he could take on 
different projects (to develop tourism in Xucun) when the original project did not work out. 
Distribution of power to local government also enabled the She County government to initiate 
                                                             
25
 SARS is a kind of respiratory disease that is extremely infectious. People would stay at home to avoid being 
infected. Thus, it greatly affected the tourism industry at that time. 
 
87 
 
the development of tourism.  
Xucun’s tourism project was contracted as a joint development project rather than as a rental 
arrangement (government renting the village to the private sector), as was done in Hongcun and 
Chengkan. In other words, the local government and the private sector were jointly involved in 
tourism development according to the contract. Why has tourism development faltered with this 
joint arrangement? The first reason is the decreasing number of historical buildings.  
We cannot say that Xucun is a historical village now; it is a new village with some historical 
buildings now. The new buildings are far more in number than the old ones. (Interview with 
employee of Xucun’s tourism company, 06/07/2013) 
When asked why this is happening, the response was:  
This is the government’s responsibility. The biggest problem is the problem of government. 
No government will say that it won’t preserve the heritage, but the degree that it preserves is 
different. See all these houses; they all used to be historical houses. They fell into ruin and 
were rebuilt in the past 10 years. We cannot do anything about it. (Interview with employee 
of Xucun’s tourism company, 06/07/2013) 
Building construction in Xucun was evident during the tour, especially involving structures 
not on the tourism route. (See Figs. 5.4 and 5.5.) 
  
Figures 5.4–5.5 Construction of modern houses in Xucun. (By author.) 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Cultural Relics Preservation Law and many related 
administrative regulations were established for historical villages. Why can Xucun’s villagers 
continue to alter their historical houses?  
The local villagers’ altering their houses is not the tourism company’s business; it is the 
government that should regulate them. We are investors from outside and cannot regulate the 
local villagers.  
 
There are regulations that preserve the historical buildings; you need to interview the 
government. The government will definitely tell you that villagers cannot alter their houses. It 
is a regulation made by Anhui Province, which is useless. The tourism company has made 
many plans. But making planning’s purpose is to put on display [instead of real 
implementation]. Two years ago, the tourism company made a plan for future land use. 
However, a building for the town government was constructed exactly where the parking lot 
was supposed to be according to the plan. City planning is also useless. (Interview with the 
head of Xucun’s tourism company, 06/07/2013) 
This portion of my interview with this employee highlights the poor implementation of 
regulations. The local residents did not receive any benefits from the tourism market, which 
contributed to their choosing to rebuild their houses. It is interesting that the supervisor of the 
tourism company claimed, “We [the tourism company] are the Other. We are the investor from 
outside and cannot regulate the local villager.” The tourism company’s recognition of itself as the 
Other in Xucun is closely related to the social organization in rural China. As Xiaotong Fei 
(1992) points out, social organization in rural China is very closely bounded. Everyone in a 
village knows everyone else and everyone’s private business. This is perceived as normal. If 
something happens to one family, all the other families in the village know about it quickly. If 
someone who does not belong to the village arrives, everyone knows and perceives that person 
as an outsider. For example, I remember one day when I went to Xucun by myself for fieldwork. 
Everyone in the village stared at me, looking at me from top to bottom. The tightly knit nature of 
Xucun may well be related to its low level of tourism development. With few tourists arriving in 
the village, local villagers are more inclined to preserve a rural and close-knit lifestyle and way 
of thinking, a very different situation from Chengkan and Hongcun. 
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The Xucun town government has a different interpretation of poor heritage preservation in 
the village. A government official in Xuncun whom I interviewed claimed that tourism 
development in Xucun did not bring benefits to the local villagers. The government did not have 
money to help the villagers fix their old houses to meet the regulations in the Cultural Relics 
Preservation Law. Therefore, if the house was in disrepair, the local government approved 
villagers’ applications to rebuild their houses.  
Humans are much more important; unpreserved historical houses will fall down and hurt 
people. (Interview with a Xucun government official, 06/07/2013) 
Another reason for weak tourism development is the poor condition of the unpaved roads, 
which appears to be a reflection of the local government’s attitude towards tourism.  
The main problem is the poor road; the big tour buses cannot drive on it. The government did 
not reconstruct the road as stipulated in the contract. Of course, the tourism company cannot 
do the government’s work and construct a road. The main problem in China is that the leaders 
of local governments change too frequently. The next leader won’t recognize the contract 
signed by previous leaders. They say it should be the people [the former leader] who signed 
the contract to implement it. The contract is useless. They [Xucun town government] 
promised to broaden the road in 2005; however, they did not do that until now. The tourism 
company had talked with the government, and they [government officials] said they did not 
have money to broaden the road. If the contract is made by two private companies, the 
tourism company can sue them [the other company]. It is hard to sue the government. They 
[Xucun town government] said they did not have money to broaden the road, and then we 
said we did not have money to invest the tourism here. It’s hard to say. [In the contract, the 
local government is responsible for road construction while the Xucun local tourism company 
is responsible for cash investment.] China is not a society to follow rules or laws; situations 
change with different leaders. (Interview with the head of Xucun tourism company, 
06/07/2013) 
In Xucun, the government did not involve itself in tourism development. It left the tourism 
company to fail in the market. According to a government official involved in policy making, 
there are many considerations for local government officials. When it is impossible to compete 
with adjacent villages, they will not risk their careers by enraging local villagers by forcing them 
to live in ramshackle houses. The stability and security of society appear to be much more 
important to them than economic growth.  
The principle of calculation (for the cost of manufacturing freedom) is what is called security. 
That is to say, liberalism, the liberal art of government, is forced to determine the precise 
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extent to which and up to what point individual interest, that is to say, individual interests 
insofar as they are different and possibly opposed to each other, constitute a danger for the 
interest of all. The problem of security is the protection of the collective interest against 
individual interests. Conversely, individual interests have to be protected against everything 
that could be seen as an encroachment of the collective interests. The freedom of the workers 
must not become a danger for the enterprise and production. (Foucault, 2008: 65) 
Security could explain the government’s attitude and behavior toward tourism in Xucun. As 
mentioned, it did not carry out the terms stipulated in the original signed contract. The 
government knows it would be impossible to compete with villages like Hongcun, Xidi (another 
World Heritage Site in this region), and Chengkan. Preserving historical houses requires money, 
and local villagers cannot afford or are unwilling to pay the cost of restoration. Thus, to avoid 
conflict with the villagers by forcing them to reside in dilapidated houses, the government has 
allowed them to rebuild.  
In the three villages of Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun, each local government has its own 
rationale about how and to what extent it becomes involved in tourism development. Foucault 
has argued that governmental reason involves a balance or choice of interests, which is the 
principle of exchange and the criterion of utility (Foucault, 2008: 44). What differentiate the 
governments of the three villages are the types of interest and whose interest they choose. 
According to my analysis and fieldwork, it is clear that economic growth and security are behind 
their different enactments of governmental reason, which is exactly the standard by which the 
upper government evaluates local government officials (Silamu and Seyiti, 2007).  
To regulate  local governments, the Chinese central governments controls the financial 
decisions of local governments, and local governments must compete for monies from the central 
government. In this way, local governments become entrepreneurs who need to calculate their 
costs and benefits; this calculation may lead to the belief that the cost of implementing 
preservation laws is worthless. This calculation is an important feature of neoliberal government 
(Foucault, 2008: 148).  
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Local Community 
Although a majority of the people I interviewed told me they are highly regulated in terms 
of changes to their houses, I observed many changes, more than I would expect given the number 
of people who spoke of strict regulations. It was surprising to see many new buildings and 
houses under construction inside Xucun’s village boundaries.  
The head of Xucun’s tourism company claimed that Xucun cannot now be considered a 
historical village and that it should be seen as a new socialist village that has several historical 
sites. He stated that the government’s failure to enforce historic preservation regulations caused 
this. Yet, expanding on an earlier excerpt by a local government official,  
The houses under construction were those about to fall down. People are the most important 
thing. If a wall is going to fall down and hurt people, we need to tear it down. (Interview with 
a local government official, 06/07/2013) 
Although local residents claimed they could not alter their historical houses, many could 
alter or rebuild if the structures posed a risk of hurting people. As such, Xucun’s residents did not 
face the problem that Hongcun’s or Chengkan’s residents did: they did not have to live in a 
ramshackle house because of strict enforcement of preservation regulations. However, it did 
demonstrate that there was little or no support for preservation. 
The government claimed that cultural relics need preservation; however, the government 
would not pay for it. If villagers’ private houses are falling into disrepair and they do not have 
money to fix them, and if they do not have vacant land on which to build a new house, the 
local villagers let their house fall down naturally without repairing it. In this way, they could 
build a new one” (Interview with the head of Xucun tourism company, 06/07/2013). 
 
Case Study 1: Retired High School Teacher as Tour Guide 
Actually, I am the only tour guide in Xucun. I use many stories I got from my old father and 
from the head of the tourism company, who did archival research about Xucun’s history. I 
collected them and designed the tour script according to my own knowledge. Some of the 
tourists come here for me. They want to listen to me telling stories about Xucun. I am a son 
of the Xu family. When tourists are interested in the cultural relics of Xucun, I am very 
 
92 
 
enthusiastic and excited.  
Our village has lots of difficulties, like an underdeveloped economy and not enough 
investment capital. There is not enough money to salvage national treasures, let alone to 
package cultural relics for development. Xucun was very prosperous in the old times, and it is 
very hard to recover what it used to be in Qing or Ming Dynasties. [That is to say, it was a big 
village in the old times, so nowadays to recover it at that scale is very difficult.] Even to 
recover the middle part of Xucun is very hard. (06/06/2013) 
During the conversation, he seemed much more concerned about preserving Xucun’s local 
cultural relics than about the low salary paid by the tour company. Serving as the tourism guide 
is his own way of heritage making for “his” village, and it gave him his identity. He then 
explained the reason for poor tourism development: 
Interviewee: None of the government officials in our village share the family name of Xu. 
One came and left after three years. Another came and left after two years. Nobody took 
charge or took the responsibility of cultural relics’ preservation. Nowadays, nobody cares 
[about] the monuments established nearby the national treasures by the State Council. The 
government regulation stipulated that structures within 100 meters need to be controlled 
while no building construction is allowed within 50 meters. However, nobody managed this, 
the cultural relics got destroyed and new buildings were easily built.  
 
Yi: What about the preservation regulation? 
 
Interviewee: It did not get implemented. The heaven is high and the emperor is far way—
there is no support for it. (06/06/2013) 
In his mind, local government is the agent to be blamed for poor tourism development. The 
officials are not Xucun people, and they do not share heritage with the local villagers. Knowing 
that Xucun cannot compete with villages like Hongcun and Chengkan and knowing that it is 
risky to regulate local villages, the officials ignore the contracts signed by previous leaders. Also, 
aware that they will leave in three years, a span of time too short to make the tourism industry 
boom, they ignore tourism development. However, I assume what this villager wants is a 
restoration of what had been present, not implementation of the kind of tourism brought by the 
fake heritage sites, such as the water garden in Chengkan.   
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Case Study 2: Grocery Store Owner 
Thinking I was a journalist, one local villager started a conversation and illustrated the 
preservation problem in Xucun by opening the door of his neighbor’s house to let me see in 
(Figs. 5.6–5.7). It was an old house with many delicate-looking decorations.  
 
Figure 5.6: Inside a closed private house. (By author.) 
My thoughts about this house, however, centered on fear. I was afraid it would fall down 
and hurt me. What scared me more was its atmosphere: quite dark and gray. If there were a ghost 
story to be told, this house would be the setting. Because it is a house built 300 years ago, it is 
natural to wonder about the different things that went on there over time: for example, what love 
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stories, who died without fulfilling a dream, etc. Similar to what Caitlin DeSilvey wrote 
regarding the display of nonpristine settings rather than manicured historical sites, I gained more 
understanding from this nonpreserved house with no tour guide (DeSilvey, 2006).  
 
Figure 5.7: Another view of the house. (By author.) 
I am not sure I would be willing to live in the house. Although a valuable house historically, 
it seems too dark and dilapidated for habitation. The person who opened the door said the owner 
had tried to sell the house as a whole to someone specifically for preservation or possibly for it to 
be put on exhibition. However, the local government did not approve the sale, and the local 
tourism company did not accept it as a tourism site. Other, similarly dilapidated and unselected 
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heritage sites could be observed in Xucun. 
 
Figure 5.8: Dilapidated historical house in Xucun. (By author.) 
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These unused, unpreserved heritage sites raise a question: how does one go about 
preserving a historical house? Sometimes, it is obvious the locals are taken advantage of by the 
local tourism company and by the government through exploitation of villagers’ ancestors’ labor 
for profit (i.e., their houses and property) and through the taking away of their property rights by 
forcing them to preserve their houses. However, sometimes the emptied ramshackle house has 
much more significance. As DeSilvey said, a piece of paper from an old book could form a poem 
created by worms or rats (DeSilvey, 2006). In the same way, the ramshackle house is rebuilt by 
time, by wind, by stories, and by generations who have lived there.  
Another question emerges: do the dilapidated houses represent failure or crisis because 
there are no tourists viewing or experiencing them? Gale maintains that when “reduction in 
arrivals is equated with failure or crisis” it is “a typically ‘economic’ reaction that does not allow 
for some destinations purposively withdrawing from tourism” (Gale, 2012: 42). Opening these 
houses to tourists requires some restoration and decoration to cater to mass tourism. Some other 
heritage tourism sites (e.g., Hongcun and Chengkan) were even rebranded in an old way to be 
authentic. Can one say that the houses in Xucun are failures while those on heritage tours in 
Hongcun and Chengkan are successes? This is about the powers that shape discourse, which 
further defines what is successful.   
I have to admit that I felt selfish for enjoying the singular beauty triggered by an empty 
ramshackled house: it was someone’s private property, someone who had to leave it in its state of 
disrepair, deciding not to destroy it to build a modern, comfortable house. This house concluded 
my fieldwork in Xucun and also in this region. With modern houses everywhere and poor 
tourism development, Xucun’s local villagers seem much more content than Chengkan’s and 
Hongcun’s villagers do. Thus, it tells a totally different story than Hongcun, which is seen as a 
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benchmark by similar historical villages such as Chengkan. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Summary 
To introduce the summation of my thesis, I revisit my discussion with the senior villager 
who gave lectures inside of an ancestral hall in Chengkan. That hall had belonged to the 
villager’s family before 1949. After 1949, the Communist Party transformed it into state-owned 
property, and it served as a primary school from 1949 to 1992. In 1993, the local government 
repaired it and opened it to the public as a tourism site. This decision was influenced by the 
central government’s Open and Reform policy and correspond to a worldwide trend toward 
neoliberal forms of governance. To encourage economic growth, the central government 
redistributed some power to local governments and linked the personnel promotion system to the 
sometimes incompatible goals of local economic growth and local social stability.  That is to say, 
local government officials had a greater possibility of promotion if their local economy was more 
prosperous than another local economy and if the locality experience upward social mobility, 
little social conflict and demographic change.  As a result, most local government officials tried 
their best to promote tourism for local economic growth while guaranteeing security.  
In summer 2013, I conducted fieldwork in three nearby villages in China with a similar set 
of cultural relics.  I found that the local governments of two of the villages sought out external 
investment capital as a means to develop tourism and compete with other localities. This 
investment was accompanied by the involvement of business entrepreneurs who marketed each 
village as unique sites to attract tourists. In some instances, they preserved the villages and 
claimed they appeared now exactly as they did when built 300 years ago (e.g. s Hongcun.) In 
some villages, they changed the cultural relics to a certain degree to make them unique (e.g. 
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Chengkan.)  
What did these efforts mean to local villagers? For some, it meant they could not decorate, 
improve, or maintain their houses because the structures were supposed to remain true to what 
was constructed 300 years ago. For others, it meant they had to watch their identity and culture 
be misrepresented by external developers. I investigated these issues through my fieldwork and 
interviews in the three adjacent villages of Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun. 
Hongcun is a World Heritage Site and, as such, attracts more tourists than the other two 
historical villages. The local county government introduced and authorized one real estate 
company—Jingyi Company to develop the tourism economy in Hongcun. To put Hongcun on 
display, Jingyi constructed not only infrastructure for tourism (e.g., a parking lot capable of 
handling large motor coaches, a hotel) but also heritage. Here, heritage construction for tourism 
included selection of historical sites for display and reinvention of historical stories for a pageant 
play to attract tourists.  
Because of good marketing strategies and the designation as a World Heritage Site, profits 
from gate fees charged by Jingyi totaled 77.56 million RMB (US$12.35 million) in 2012. 
However, none of these profits were shared with the local residents. The villagers protested and 
sued the local government and the tourism company; these actions resulted in the local 
community now receiving 20 percent of the gate fee. 
When tourism development began, local residents’ lives were dramatically transformed. 
Some of the villagers were willing to change, while others were forced to change. Some opened 
their houses as inns, decorating the inside in a modern style but keeping the outside the same as 
it was 300 years ago, as required. Some lost their agriculture land to parking lotsor highway 
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construction and, because of financial necessity, had to become employees of the tourism 
company.  
Chengkan is another historical village that has attracted external capital. Even though the 
village has cultural assets similar to those of Hongcun (or that some observers claim are even 
better than Hongcun’s), Chengkan is not a World Heritage Site due to political reasons. It has 
tried many unique marketing strategies to compete with Hongcun, such as branding the village as 
the “No. 1 feng shui village,” constructing a fake water garden to demonstrate its feng shui 
authenticity, and implementing strict preservation regulations.   
Chengkan villagers’ experiences with tourism development thus differ from Hongcun 
villagers’. Because it is not as famous as Hongcun, the number of tourists is lower, and the gate 
fee charged by the tourism company is barely shared with the local residents. According to 
interviewees, local residents receive the equivalent of US$5 in health insurance every year. Thus, 
the villagers in Chengkan have a portion of their health insurance paid by the tourism company 
as their share of profits from tourism development. I did not observe the lifestyle changes in 
Chengkan that I had seen in Hongcun, even though some villagers’ agricultural land had been 
taken by the tourism company.  
I also conducted fieldwork in Xucun because it represents a village in a different county and 
has little tourism development. In Xucun, local residents were allowed to rebuild their house if it 
was going to fall down, even though the preservation law enacted by the State Council and the 
preservation regulations enacted by the provincial People’s Congress were in place. Because 
tourism in Xucun is very weak, many of the village’s young adults become migrant workers in 
the big cities.  Xucun’s older residents and children remain, the norm in most rural villages in 
China.  
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To improve tourism development in Xucun, the tourism company and local government 
officials need to work more closely together and make concerted efforts on tourism’s behalf. 
According to my interviews, both parties had signed a contract stipulating that the local 
government is responsible for constructing a road and the tourism company is responsible for 
cash investment in infrastructure construction. However, neither is fulfilling its duties as defined 
in the contract. Local government officials change every three to five years, and incoming 
officials have not adhered to the contract’s terms as far as  road improvement goes; also, they 
have not enforced preservation regulations among the villagers, who can rebuild their houses for 
the sake of security. The head of Xucun’s tourism company said, “It is useless to sue the 
government….because they did not follow the contract, why should we follow it?" This has led 
to weak tourism development in Xucun and has left local residents to live the same lifestyle as 
rural villagers elsewhere in China. 
Because residents are allowed to make changes to, or rebuild, their historical houses as 
modern houses, "Xucun cannot be called a historical village."  The head of Xucun’s tourism 
company maintains that the place:  “can only be called a new socialist village that contains some 
cultural relics.” Visitors could experience, however, a sense of authenticity because there were 
some historical houses, though dilapidated and uninhabited. 
The three villages represent three different development levels under three different county 
governments’ management. Hongcun is seen as the benchmark for historical villages’ 
development; Chengkan is trying to match Hongcun’s success with its own strategies; and 
Xucun is village not taking extreme measures to lure tourists and illustrates a totally different 
story. 
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Contribution of My Research 
Overall, my findings illuminate several issues related to heritage making, governmentality, 
local community resistance, entrepreneurship, identity, historical preservation, and property 
rights. My thesis also contributes to the understanding of heritage tourism through the lens of 
landscape and political economy in the Chinese context. 
Scholars have discussed heritage as being something that is constructed purposely for 
different uses (Graham, Ashworth, and Tunbridge, 2000; Lowenthal, 1985.) Heritage tourism 
offers a rationale for entering into heritage making, which involves negotiations among the state, 
private sector, and local community. According to Zhang, Chong, and Ap (1999), before 1978 
the Chinese state had treated tourism as a diplomatic activity.  After that, the country began 
pursuing economic growth through the tourism industry. Timothy Oakes (2013) points out that 
heritage tourism is used as a strategy for economic development in China today.  
At the village level, the meaning of heritage making through heritage tourism is influenced 
by private sector companies.  Given differences in these companies and differences in how they 
interact with local government, heritage tourism and heritage making varies from place to place.   
Commonalities, however, include tourism companies’ selection of several historical houses as 
tourism attractions while excluding others, mainly to minimize costs. The selected sites are either 
state-owned properties or individual houses contracted with tourism companies, both situations 
making them inexpensive to use. In the case of the local community as an agent in heritage 
making, villagers focus on heritage making not only as an avenue for profit but also as a means 
to express their identity. For example, individual homeowners in Hongcun, unsatisfied with 
conditions offered by the tourism company, act as entrepreneurs, transforming their dwellings 
into tourism attraction sites and charging additional entrance fees. In the adjacent village of 
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Chengkan, the situation is different; local residents make their own heritage by giving lectures to 
tourists. In Xucun, one resident claims his heritage by serving as a tourist guide for the private 
sector company. These different realities provide illustrations of local communities’ heritage 
making.  
On the national scale, heritage making for UNESCO in China has been examined by 
scholars in terms of governance (Shepherd, 2006) and economic growth (Su and Teo, 2009) but 
not in terms of the detailed process of heritage making (designation) for UNESCO. My research 
in Huangshan city suggests that heritage making for UNESCO is both a top-down and bottom-up 
process, which is initiated by the state and implemented by private and local actors. Designation 
is a process instigated by the central and provincial governments, leaving the city, county and 
village levels to work out the details as to how tourism will actually take place.  Although the 
central government also enacts policies that should guide tourist development throughout China 
and be implemented universally, my research shows that adherence to policy varies significantly 
by locality.  
Heritage making by the state has also been discussed by scholars in terms of nationality 
construction and economic income (Sofield and Li, 2011). Based on my research, heritage 
making has been mainly adopted for tourism to pursue GDP growth. Local governments promote 
heritage tourism as development projects for economic growth with power distributed from the 
central government. By introducing external capital, some historical villages in Huangshan city, 
Anhui province, have been largely transformed for heritage tourism purposes. Local government 
entities do not appear to be concerned with the accuracy of the heritage publicized by the private 
sector, such as the water garden in Chengkan and feng shui marketing, which is largely different 
from the main tenets of the Chinese Communist Party. 
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State heritage making also suggests the governmentality of the Chinese (government) state. 
There is a debate about this governmentality: is it market driven? Does it represent neoliberalism 
with limited government intervention (Harvey, 2005; He and Wu, 2009)? Or does it reflect a 
strong state involved in a different field of the society that is not limited to economic activity, 
such as social welfare and education (So, 2007)? Based on my research, it is difficult to draw a 
solid conclusion. I argue that it is a mixed governmentality with the state’s involvement through 
policies to guarantee economic growth combined with neoliberal characteristics that the state 
initiate tourism development with TVEs and then transfer it to the private sector (privatization of 
tourism), thereby distributing power to the local government.  
Scholars of heritage tourism have researched the exploitation of the local community by the 
entrepreneur state and private sector’s involvement in representing the local community’s culture 
while excluding them from the benefit sharing system. Scholars have explored resistance to 
tourism development in everyday life and the local community’s identity (Su and Teo, 2009). My 
research on the local community suggested that most of the local community members care more 
about their housing and financial interests than about identity. The six local community case 
studies in Hongcun, Chengkan, and Xucun suggest that identity is more of a concern for senior 
elite villagers, such as the retired high school teacher in Xucun and the villager giving lectures 
inside the ancestral hall in Chengkan. Others are much more concerned about the profit they 
receive from the tourism company from the gate fee, their own income through involvement in 
tourism as independent entrepreneurs, and their dwelling houses. They are strictly regulated by 
the Cultural Relics Preservation Law, which hinders the satisfaction of local community 
members’ basic living needs. 
Cultural relics preservation raises issues regarding how cultural relics are preserved. The 
 
105 
 
Cultural Relics Preservation Law dictates that historical houses built before AD 1919 cannot be 
altered and that individual homeowners are responsible for the costs of preservation. Villagers 
unable to preserve their houses leave them to deteriorate over time. However, these nonpreserved 
houses offer a much more authentic sense of heritage than the preserved houses set up and 
decorated to serve as tourist attractions. Also, the Cultural Relics Preservation Law has been the 
source of problems in the villages I studied, and it also contradicts the Real Right Law issued in 
2005. While Hongcun and Chengkan strictly enforce the preservation law, Xucun’s town 
government allows villagers to tear down ramshackle houses so they will not get hurt. The 
approach taken in Xucun also worked to protect individual homeowners’ property rights. More 
research is needed regarding property rights of historical houses in heritage tourism.  
 
Limitations 
In the process of writing my thesis, I uncovered the following limitations. 
My policy research could have been more extensive; for example, interviewing more experts 
about specific policies and requesting hard copies of the policies (instead of relying only on 
online searches). My research approach and extent may have resulted in overlooking some 
policies and in not fully knowing the stipulations of others.  Because of limited preliminary 
research, I did not have a strong enough understanding about various policies before going into 
the field, which affected my research while there and consequent interpretations.  
I found other limitations with the data I used, including interviews, and I did not obtain 
detailed statistical information, such as income and gender of the villagers and tourists. During 
some interviews, when interviewees became silent, I would say something to keep the 
conversation going, which strongly influenced the flow and interviewees’ answers. For example, 
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in Hongcun, one senior female villager did not respond when I asked her what impact tourism 
had on her life. I repeated the question and mentioned the phenomenon of tourists taking 
pictures; her answer then focused on how their taking pictures annoyed her.  
In relation to statistical data, I reviewed only city-level data, which did not include 
information on tourists. My research would have been much more complete if I had acquired 
more detailed data during my fieldwork, particularly by asking local villagers and town 
governments. I was not fully prepared before going into the field and, therefore, did not gather 
sufficient data, which limits the results of my research. I aim to avoid such problems during my 
doctoral fieldwork.  
Finally, I do not include a discussion in my thesis about the multifaceted roles of tourists. 
Consumption by tourists, for example, can actually be seen as production. I did not have an 
opportunity to interview tourists. They were difficult to access because of the tours’ structure: 
tourists most often closely followed the tourist guide and quickly went through the village, 
finishing the tour in 45 minutes; once the tour was over, they left the village. Hongcun has 
successfully established some family inns (decorated with traditional themes, catering to tourists’ 
desire for nostalgia) to house tourists overnight. These arrangements may make tourists more 
accessible for interviews (after establishing permissions from the appropriate parties). Chengkan 
and Xucun, however, have not yet established these kinds of accommodations, thereby making 
opportunities to communicate directly with tourists scarce. 
 
Future Research 
During my research, fieldwork, and writing, I became aware of many interesting issues and 
opportunities that deserve further exploration, such as a new project sponsored by the World 
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Bank that involves development on a global and local scale.  
I learned of the “A Hundred Villages and a Thousand Houses” project, initiated by the 
Huangshan city government. It includes 101 historical villages and 1,065 historical houses. 
According to the official website of Huangshan city government, 
This project will form a preservation plan according to the preservation theme, feature, and 
boundary for each historical village or for individual historical houses. Through different 
preservation approaches, such as total preservation, centralized preservation, and forced 
preservation, the cultural relics will get preserved. It will be finished in five years, between 
2009 and 2013. (Translated from the government’s official website) 
During my interview with a Huangsan city government official at the Cultural Relics 
Bureau, the government office in charge of this project, I began to understand the involvement of 
the World Bank: 
Official: We have set up an office to deal with the World Bank; it is called the World Bank 
Loan Office. The World Bank has already agreed to loan us almost US$100 million. The first 
installment will come this year [2013]. This is also a project given by the National 
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The World Bank loan is 
a scarce resource and is very hard to get. They only issue loans for projects that will 
contribute to the country, to the world, and to human beings in general.  
 
Yi: What conditions were agreed to for the loan? 
 
Official: They could not understand the “A Hundred Villages and a Thousand Houses” 
concept, so we packaged the project from the perspective of building beautiful villages. They 
can definitely understand this. Actually, building a beautiful homeland is similar to preserving 
the historical town, fixing heritage sites, and using the heritage. (Interview with the leader of 
Cultural Relics Bureau in the city of Huangshan) 
The World Bank is known for providing small loans to women in third world countries to 
help them become entrepreneurs and to improve living conditions of families. The role of the 
World Bank in social justice and in the context of Africa and Latin America is also well-known. 
It would be interesting to look into its role in China given the strong hand of the Chinese 
government.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, my thesis contributes to an understanding of heritage tourism in terms of political 
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economy and landscape in the Chinese context. I recognize the collectiveness of a community 
and the existence of a structured system as both influencing heritage tourism and the ideologies 
involved with political economy. China is a socialist country that tries to incorporate capitalist 
economics and socialist politics. Heritage tourism in China is not playing out as it does in a 
capitalist society. I show how heritage tourism guides a broader political economy and social 
system as it raises questions about state power and local autonomy.  On a smaller scale, I discuss 
differences and representations, which could also reflect social injustice and complications in the 
local community.  
As such, I combine political economy and local context through a landscape framework in 
my discussion about different levels. Representation of heritage for tourism can be interpreted 
differently by different agents, and, overall, the construction of heritage sites for tourism can be 
perceived as materialized discourse, with a negotiation of power behind those discourses, that is, 
ideology.  
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